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This project explores the role that the United States Supreme Court plays in 
shaping public opinion. Previous scholars have successfully demonstrated that political 
elites influence public opinion, but those researching the Court’s influence on attitude 
change have reached mixed findings. I build on previous work in three important ways. 
First, I employ a method of attributing attitude change to the Court that is a theoretical 
and empirical improvement over previous ways of identifying those who should be 
influenced by the justices, “reception” of cases. By “reception”, I mean whether an 
individual understands the Court’s decisions. Second, I place Court decisions within the 
broader information environment that includes the cues sent to the public by other 
political elites. These cues may reinforce or undermine the justices’ decision, which 
could amplify or undercut the effect of receiving cases on attitude change. Third, I take 
advantage of recent work on the dynamics of attitude change by interacting reception 
with one’s relevant pre-existing beliefs and personal characteristics. 
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To test these assertions, I use a mixed method, multi-case design that combines 
existing survey research with original data collected from a quasi-experiment conducted 
in summer 2005. The results indicate that under certain conditions, receiving Court 
decisions is associated with attitude change on the issues involved in the cases. This 
project closes with several suggestions for future research including how to refine 
reception as a method of attributing attitude change to the Court. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The fundamental question of this project is: Can the United States Supreme Court 
influence public opinion, and if so, how? The relationship between the Court and public 
opinion is not completely clear. The existing scholarship speaks to this question, but does 
not yet adequately answer it. I contend that elites drive changes in public opinion and that 
we do not know enough about the Court as an elite role-player in this process. By issuing 
decisions, the Court has the ability to focus elites and the public on an issue. This creates 
an elite debate on the issue that includes and responds to the Court’s actions. The media 
deliver the elite debate, including the cues provided by the Court in its opinions, to a 
potentially persuadable public. 
Previous research in public law has reached mixed findings on whether the Court 
is driving public opinion. I build on existing work in three important ways. First, I use a 
variable to attribute attitude change to the Court that is often overlooked by previous 
scholars: the effect of receiving the Court’s cues on public opinion. I contend that 
“reception” of a case, which is measured by an individual’s ability to demonstrate that 
he/she understood the decision, is an improvement over previous methods of identifying 
those who should be influenced by the Court. If the Court is driving public opinion, then 
its effect should be evident among those receiving the justices’ elite cues. Second, I place 
the Court in political context by situating its message within the broader elite debate on 
the issues associated with the cases. Last, I account for several factors that should 
influence the probability that an individual will accept the new information provided by 
the Court and update his/her position on the issue associated with a case. These factors 
1 
include receiving cues from other political elites, one’s affinity for the Court, political 
attributes, and personal characteristics. Together, this integrates the Court’s message into 
a broader information environment and reflects some of the recent developments on the 
dynamics of attitude change. 
To test these assertions, I investigate the effect of four cases—Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services (1989),1 Stanford v. Kentucky,2 Van Orden v. Perry 
(2005),3 and McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky (2005)4—on attitudes 
toward abortion, the death penalty, and public displays of the Ten Commandments. To do 
this, I combine original content analysis of media reports on the Court in 1989 and 2005 
with (1) existing national panel survey data from 1989 and (2) an original quasi-
experiment conducted in 2005. Using a multi-method approach, I investigate the effect of 
receiving elite cues from Supreme Court justices on attitude change and gain leverage on 
how the public responds to Court cases. 
Whether the Supreme Court influences public opinion has implications for public 
policy, judicial decision-making, and its institutional legitimacy. By leading public 
opinion and increasing support for the Court’s preferred policy position, policy 
implementation may become easier. Alternatively, if the Court is stimulating a backlash 
against its articulated position, then there will be more opposition to the policy and 
implementation can become significantly more difficult (Cannon and Johnson 1998). 
When the Court takes positions and shapes political debate on a topic, the policy choices 
                                                 
1 492 U.S. 490. 
2 492 U.S. 361. Stanford was consolidated with Wilkins v. Missouri. Although they originally were two 
different cases, the Court issued one decision dealing with both cases. For the remainder of this project, I 
will refer to this case as Stanford.  
3 545 U.S. 677. 
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of elected officials are altered as the legal and political landscape changes (Hoekstra 
2003). Since changes in public opinion can affect judicial decision-making (Mishler and 
Sheehan 1993, Mishler and Sheehan 1996, Erikson, MacKuen, Stimson 2002, McGuire 
and Stimson 2004), the Court may be influencing the positions that justices take in the 
future by altering public attitudes on an issue.5 Last, although there is evidence that the 
public’s support for the Court does not vary given specific decisions (Caldeira and 
Gibson 1992, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003), some research demonstrates that 
agreement with decisions can translate into evaluations of the institution (Mondak 1994, 
Grosskopf and Mondak 1998, Price and Romantan 2004).  
ORGANIZATION OF THIS PROJECT 
The chapters that follow address the theoretical motivations of the project and 
empirical methods to asses the Court’s influence on public opinion. Chapter Two surveys 
the existing public law literature on Court driven attitude change and theoretically derives 
the hypotheses tested in later chapters. I also develop reception as an improved method of 
attributing attitude change to the Court. This chapter highlights some of the similarities 
and differences between public law and American politics research on this topic.  
Chapter Three continues to build reception of cases as a method for attributing 
attitude change to the Court and also places the Court in political context. This chapter 
begins with a discussion of the cues provided by the Court and other elites to the public. 
It also establishes reception rates for the cases and the individual-level determinants of 
receiving cases.  
                                                                                                                                                 
4 545 U.S. 844. 
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In Chapters Four and Five, my focus changes to the effect of receiving Court 
decisions on public opinion. Chapter Four addresses the effect of receiving Webster and 
Stanford on abortion and death penalty attitudes. Chapter 5 examines the influence of 
receiving Van Orden and McCreary on attitudes toward publicly displaying the Ten 
Commandments.  
As developed in Chapters Four and Five, the effect of Supreme Court decisions 
on public opinion should be influenced by several variables with the central factor being 
reception of the decision. If the Court is driving public opinion, it should be evident 
among those receiving its message. By measuring reception using whether an individual 
understands elite cue provided by the justices and accounting for other factors like 
consumption of the broader elite debate, I can better attribute any attitude change to the 
Court. 
The analysis in Chapters Four and Five is presented in stages. The first stage 
establishes whether there was individual level attitude change on abortion, the death 
penalty, or support for public displays of the Ten Commandments after the Court cases. 
After discussing the nature and contours of attitude change, I compare those who 
received the cases to those who do not. This sets the stage for regression analysis to test 
the relevant hypotheses, which is followed by a discussion of the results. 
Chapter Six concludes this project. The last chapter reviews the results of each 
chapter and discusses future avenues of research. The chapter also includes a discussion 
of the potential limitations of this study. 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 But see also Norpoth and Segal (1994) and Segal and Spaeth (2002, 1993) for an alternative perspective. 
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Chapter 2: The U.S. Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Elite Driven 
Attitude Change and Receiving Court Cases 
The connection between the U.S. Supreme Court and public opinion has 
generated a substantial amount of research in political science. Much of this research 
focuses on public opinion as an “input” into judicial decision-making. Scholars 
frequently examine whether and how public opinion directly or indirectly influences the 
Court’s decisions. Those studying the direct effect of public opinion on the Court 
generally focus on whether changes in mass attitudes systematically lead to changes in 
how justices decide cases. For example, if the public as a whole becomes more liberal, 
does this translate into more liberal decisions by the Court (e.g. Mishler and Sheehan 
1993, Norpoth and Segal 1994, Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995, Mishler and 
Sheehan 1996, Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002, McGuire and Stimson 2004) or 
individual justices (Flemming and Wood 1997)? Other scholars look for the indirect 
effects of public opinion on judicial decision-making and focus on the importance of 
elections. From the indirect effect perspective, changes in public opinion produce 
different presidents and Senates, which eventually result in altering the Court’s 
composition. As justices from the old regime retire, resign, or die, justices with beliefs in-
line with the new law-making majority replace them (e.g. Dahl 1957, Segal and Spaeth 
2002). While questions on the nature of public opinion as an “input” into judicial 
decision-making certainly exist, the research in this area is rather extensive. 
There is also research on the “output” side of judicial decision-making, which 
explores the effect of Court cases on public opinion. One avenue of “output” research is 
5 
whether Court decisions translate into the public’s evaluation of the institution (e.g. 
Mondak 1992, Grosskopf and Modak 1998, Hoekstra 2000, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2003, Hoekstra 2003). The “output” side also includes work on how public opinion 
relates to the success of the Court as an organ of national policymaking and instrument of 
social change (e.g. Rosenberg 1991, Cannon and Johnson 1998). 
This project focuses on a different “output” side question: does the U.S. Supreme 
Court influence attitude change on the issues associated with its cases, and if so, how? 
While there has been a fair amount of research on this question, the results for whether 
Court decisions influence attitude change are decidedly mixed. We still know little about 
the conditions under which the Court can influence public opinion. Consequently, it is 
unsurprising that we know even less about the individual-level characteristics that 
influence the effect of Court decisions on mass attitudes. Even an aspect of this topic with 
scholarly consensus, that the public must be aware of Court decisions in order to be 
influenced by them, generates inconsistent results from a variety of research designs. 
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, I examine the relevant literature on 
the effect of the Court on attitude change, which is typified by mixed findings. Second, I 
develop a theory of elite driven, Court induced attitude change that bridges the gap 
between American politics and public law. This theory hinges on “reception” of Court 
cases. By “reception”, I mean that individuals must be exposed to Court cases and 
understand the decisions. Third, I summarize the data and methods used to investigate 
the effect of receiving Webster, Stanford, Van Orden and McCreary on the issues 
associated with the cases: abortion, the death penalty, and publicly displaying the Ten 
Commandments. 
6 
THE PUBLIC’S RESPONSE TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: MULTIPLE METHODS 
AND MIXED RESULTS 
Compared to the impact of either the president or Congress, the existing literature 
on whether the Court can influence public opinion is limited (Caldeira 1991). While 
limited, it has grown since Caldeira’s (1991) assessment of the field. Today, it is a 
methodologically diverse research area as scholars use national and local surveys, panel 
studies, and experimental designs. Given the success of other scholars connecting elite 
cues to public opinion (e.g. Zaller 1992, Adams 1997), it is surprising that the research in 
this area is characterized by mixed findings; in fact, we see sometimes little or no Court 
effect on mass attitudes. Although I contend that receiving elite cues provided by the 
Court influences public opinion, it is useful to discuss the findings of other scholars, 
especially those doubting the justices’ ability to cause attitude change. 
Early work on the Court’s ability to shape public opinion focused on what 
Franklin and Kosaki (1989) dubbed the positive response hypothesis. Emanating from 
Dahl’s (1957) seminal work, the positive response hypothesis asserts that the Court 
should be able to increase support for the policies it adopts because of its institutional 
legitimacy and special place in society as a neutral arbiter of law. However, when 
political scientists tested this hypothesis, there was little evidence of increased support for 
the Court’s articulated positions (Barnum 1985, Marshall 1988, Marshall 1989). Scholars 
connected the apparent lack of attitude change to low public awareness of Court 
decisions resulting from sparse media attention to the cases and insulation of justices 
from elections (Rosenberg 1991, Page and Shapiro 1992, Segal and Spaeth 1993, Perry 
1999, Segal, Spaeth and Benesh 2006). When there is evidence of attitude change on 
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issues, the changes in public opinion are not related to the Court, but are attributed to 
other political actors (Rosenberg 1991) or trends in public opinion since World War II 
(Barnum 1985, Page and Shapiro 1992). Using an experimental design, Bass and Thomas 
(1984) reach similar conclusions finding that the Court’s position on an issue had no 
impact on policy evaluations. Recent experimental research echoes these conclusions as 
Clawson and Waltenberg (2003) found that several affirmative action decisions did not 
have a discernable impact on African Americans. 
A growing body of research is demonstrating, however, that the public is more 
informed about (and influenced by) Court decisions than previous scholarship allowed. 
This includes the justices themselves who are convinced that Court decisions influence 
society (Perry 1991). The justices’ desire to shape the public’s response to their decisions 
manifests itself through systematic efforts to use the news media to increase public 
receptivity to cases, guard its legitimacy, encourage deference to the institution, and 
increase the chances of policy implementation (Davis 1994). 
Previous studies also suggest that the Court can deliver its message to the public 
and that people can understand it. For some cases, sizable portions of survey respondents 
can name Court decisions that they like or dislike (Murphy and Tannenhaus 1968, 
Adamany and Grossman 1983), identify abortion cases (Franklin, Kosaki, and Krizter 
1993, Franklin and Kosaki 1995) and are exposed to cases that originate in their 
community (Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Hoekstra 2000, Hoekstra 2003). This sometimes 
includes being able to discuss the basic contours of a decision even though many 
respondents could not match case names to specific outcomes. Although public 
awareness of salient Court activities does not reach the same level as other institutions or 
8 
events (Franklin, Kosaki and Kritzer 1993, Price and Zaller 1993), it should be sufficient 
for certain cases to have an effect on public opinion. 
One reason for not finding a Court effect on public opinion in early studies is that 
the positive response hypothesis suggests unidirectional change that can overlook an 
important aspect of the story—a backlash against the policies adopted by the Court. 
Instead of moving toward the Court’s articulated position, the public sometimes responds 
to decisions by losing support for policies announced in widely reported cases (Page, 
Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). Where pre- and post-decision surveys exist, it appears that 
Rehnquist Court rulings led to a net decrease in support for the Court’s articulated 
positions (Marshall 2004). Continuing the theme of creating opposition to its policy 
positions, the Court can reinvigorate once forgotten political elites by putting issues on 
the national agenda while attempting to bring an uncooperative minority into the 
developing national consensus on civil rights (Powe 2000). Recognizing the Court’s 
activity can translate into policy evaluations, Caldeira (1986) concludes that actions by 
the Court rather than FDR decreased public support for the Court Packing Plan in the 
1930s. There is also evidence that the public adjusted to the Court’s shift to a more 
restrictive abortion policy by exhibiting increased support for the status quo when it was 
threatened by Webster (Wleizen and Goggin 1993). 
Moving from the unidirectional change embodied in the positive response 
hypothesis and the backlash noted by others, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) posit that Court 
cases can cause structural changes in public opinion that may not be immediately 
apparent in national surveys. According to the structural response hypothesis, Court 
decisions activate and accentuate inter-group differences on issues like abortion. Instead 
9 
of change in one direction, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) find that Roe v. Wade (1973)6 led 
to polarization between religious groups for discretionary, non-health related abortions. 
While some groups became more supportive of discretionary abortions, other groups like 
Catholics became less permissive of non-health related abortions. Although aggregate 
levels of support for abortion in national surveys appeared to be the same over time, the 
composition of the groups supporting or opposing abortion changed. 
Johnson and Martin (1998) confirm inter-group polarization for the death penalty, 
but contend that the public response to Court cases is conditional. According to Johnson 
and Martin’ conditional response hypothesis, the Court’s ability to shape public opinion 
is limited to landmark cases in an issue area like Roe for abortion or Furman v. Georgia 
(1972)7 for the death penalty. Subsequent cases, like Webster and McClesky v. Kemp 
(1987),8 leave the Court unable to influence public opinion because people’s attitudes are 
formed after the landmark case and resistant to change. Recent scholarship casts doubt on 
the empirical validity of the conditional response hypothesis due to leaving out political 
attributes central to attitude change like partisanship. When partisanship is included in 
modeling the effect of Webster on public opinion using the same data as Johnson and 
Martin (1998), Brickman and Peterson (2006) find that case did lead to polarization, as 
did Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976).9 Johnson and Martin’s (1998) approach also 
fails to develop a method to identify landmark cases or a theory about the conditions 
under which certain landmark cases change public opinion while others may not.  
                                                 
6 410 U.S. 113. 
7 408 U.S. 238. 
8 481 U.S. 279. 
9 428 U.S. 52. 
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While the previous scholars analyze the effect of the Court on attitude change 
using cross-sectional national survey, others take advantage of panel studies. Brickman 
and Peterson (2006) use a panel design, but they rely on survey timing and a proxy for 
receiving the Court cases instead of directly measuring it. Recognizing that aggregate 
national data can overlook the regional impact of Court decisions, Hoekstra and Segal 
(1996) and Hoekstra (2000, 2003) use local panel surveys to capture the effect of several 
cases with regional interest on public opinion. These scholars conclude that the 
communities from which the cases originated had higher levels of awareness than 
national surveys, which revealed little or no nationwide exposure to the cases. The 
Court’s ability to influence local public opinion appears greatest when the issues are not 
important to individuals (Hoekstra and Segal 1996), but the overall regional effect of 
cases on local public opinion is limited and small (Hoekstra 2003). When investigating 
Court driven attitude change, Hoekstra and Segal (1996) and Hoekstra (2003) limit the 
examination only to those aware of the cases. 
Instead of using survey research, some scholars employ experimental designs and 
find that the Court influences attitude change.10 Jeffrey Mondak and others reach the 
opposite conclusion of Bass and Thomas (1984) finding that the Court is able to increase 
support for various policy positions (Mondak 1990, Mondak 1991, Hoekstra 1995, 
Mondak and Smithey 1997). The Court’s impact on evaluations of affirmative action and 
death penalty policies vary by race (Clawson and Waltenberg 2003) and individuals’ 
values (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenberg 2001). Although the experimental approach is 
                                                 
10 The experimental literature often focuses on determinants of support for the Court rather than its ability 
to influence public opinion, which is the specific issue at hand in the project (e.g. Clawson and Waltenberg 
2003, Mondak 1990, Mondak 1992, Gibson, Calderia and Spence 2002, Grosskopf and Mondak 1998). 
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criticized by some for creating artificial situations that do not reflect real world 
conditions (e.g. Hoekstra 2003), these works demonstrate that under certain conditions, 
the Court can influence public opinion.11
REVISITING THE COURT’S INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION: THE ROLE OF 
RECEIVING OF CASES AND ELITE DRIVEN ATTITUDE CHANGE 
It is necessary to revisit whether the Supreme Court is driving public opinion for 
at least two related reasons. First, it is important to update this research area to include a 
fuller understanding of the dynamics affecting attitude change. Second, given these 
dynamics of attitude change, most of the existing research uses a flawed method of 
attributing attitude change to the Court.  
Early work on whether the Court influences public opinion often did not include 
attention to the findings of social-psychology on the dynamics of attitude change. Some 
scholars simply relied on survey timing to attribute attitude change to the course. They 
divide public opinion on an issue into two categories—pre-decision and post-decision 
attitudes. If aggregate attitudes on the issue of the case appear unchanged in post-decision 
surveys, then the Court did not influence public opinion (e.g. Barnum 1985, Marshall 
1988, Marshall 1989, Rosenberg 1991). This lacks an individual-level psychological 
explanation for Court-driven attitude change. These scholars also do not specifically 
                                                 
11 I feel that this criticism is often overly dramatized. Scholars consistently recognize the importance of 
laboratory experiments in generating hypotheses. Properly implemented experimental designs can be used 
in conjunction with traditional survey research to provide more traction on the issue from alternative 
methods. Generalizability can be a problem because the experimental subjects tend to be unrepresentative 
samples of college students, but this should not outweigh the usefulness of using these approaches like 
causal estimation because appropriate survey data for this research question is rare. 
12 
identify who is receiving the new information provided by the Court or the factors that 
influence attitude change outside of possibly receiving the justices’ message. 
Much of the recent research on Court-driven attitude change borrows from social-
psychology and grows out of the Elaboration Likelihood Model or ELM (e.g. Hoekstra 
and Segal 1996, Johnson and Martin 1998, Hoekstra 2003). According to the ELM, 
attitude change results from receiving new information and several individual-level 
characteristics. The probability of receiving new information is affected by an 
individual’s interest in the topic. The more interested a person is in an issue, the more 
motivated he/she will be in seeking new information. Attitude change, however, does not 
automatically occur upon receiving new information. Instead, persuasion depends on 
whether the new information is consistent with an individual’s existing beliefs, how 
much one thinks about the topic, and other factors like source credibility. Individuals are 
resistant to the new information if it is opposed to their pre-existing positions. Also, the 
more one is concerned about an issue and thinks about it, resistance increases as it is 
easier to generate counter-arguments against the new information, which further cements 
one’s pre-existing beliefs (Petty and Cacioppo 1986, Fiske and Taylor 1991). From this 
perspective, those who are most likely to receive Court decisions are also the least likely 
to change their mind. 
While the ELM provides many useful insights for understanding the dynamics of 
Court-driven attitude change, the application of it by public law scholars raises some 
questions. Previous research relying on the ELM discusses the effect of new information 
on attitude change (e.g. Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Johnson and Martin 1998, Hoekstra 
2003), but ‘new information’ is generally limited to Court decisions. This overlooks the 
13 
important fact that Court decisions do not occur in a vacuum; Court decisions are situated 
within a boarder information environment that includes cues from other elites that may 
influence attitude change (e.g. Zaller 1992). Previous scholars often pay little attention to 
these non-Court cues and the broader information environment (e.g. Franklin and Kosaki 
1989, Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Johnson and Martin 1998, Hoekstra 2003). My approach 
builds on these works by recognizing that the public receives cues from two important 
sets of elites—the Court and other political actors—that, as discussed below, has 
important consequences for attitude change. 
Much of the previous research on Court-driven attitude change also relies on two 
flawed methods of determining who is receiving the new information provided by the 
Court, survey timing and self-reported exposure to cases. The first method tests whether 
the Court influenced pubic opinion using time as a critical variable. This approach is 
problematic because it does not isolate the effect of the Court from other factors that 
shape public opinion (e.g. Wlezien and Goggin 1993). It also assumes that the public as a 
whole will respond to Court decisions by exhibiting signs of attitude change rather than 
those aware of the cases. As demonstrated by Franklin and Kosaki (1989), this approach 
overlooks how aggregate-level stability can obscure changes occurring at the individual 
level. 
A second method attributes attitude change to the Court using self-reported 
exposure to cases. Using self-reported exposure solves some of the problems of focusing 
only on case and survey timing to explain the effect of Court decisions on public opinion. 
This approach tests whether pre-decision attitudes on an issue change after the decision 
among those who have heard of the case. Some scholars compare different pre- and post-
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decision samples to investigate if the Court is shaping attitudes on the issues associated 
with the cases (e.g. Franklin and Koskai 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998, Brickman and 
Peterson 2006).12 However, this approach is problematic because it overlooks the critical 
conceptual and empirical distinctions between receiving new information and 
understanding it (e.g. Zaller 1992, Price and Zaller 1993). 
Instead of relying on the ELM, this project extends Zaller’s (1992) reception-
accept-sample model to Court driven attitude change. Reception of new information is a 
two-step process. First, individuals are exposed to new information, and second, they 
must understand it (Zaller 1992, 42). Yet, much of the existing work on this subject 
measures the first component of reception, self-reported exposure to the case, while 
overlooking the second, comprehending the new information provided by the Court. For 
example, Franklin and Kosaki (1989), Johnson and Martin (1998) and part of Brickman 
and Peterson’s (2006)13 investigations of inter-group polarization following Court cases 
only compare those that have heard of the decision. This design overlooks whether those 
reporting exposure ever really had the second characteristic of reception, understanding 
the Court’s message (comprehension). Considering these two elements permits 
identification of the individuals who actually received the Court’s cues as opposed to 
assuming it. A major reason for the mixed findings in this research area could result from 
these flawed methods of attributing attitude change to the Court. 
                                                 
12 Even though Franklin and Kosaki (1989) and Brickman and Peterson (2006) do not rely on the ELM, 
they use self-reported exposure to attribute attitude change to the Court. Due to this, their measure of case 
awareness suffers from the same problems noted here. 
13 Brickman and Peterson (2006) also use a panel survey to investigate the effect of Danforth on abortion 
attitudes, but rely only survey timing and a proxy for reception, political sophistication, to attribute attitude 
change to the Court. Consequently, they do not measure whether an individual actually received the Court 
case. This prevents a direct comparison of those who received the case to those missing the Court’s 
message. 
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Assuming reception of the Court’s message from self-reported exposure is 
problematic for at least two reasons. First, self-reported measures of exposure are subject 
to over reporting (Zaller and Price 1993, Prior 2005).14 Consequently, some of those 
reporting exposure would include those that never really heard of the case. Second, 
remembering a case or political event is not the same as understanding it. Conflating 
exposure with comprehension runs the risk of equating those who remember the case and 
understand it with those that get the case wrong. Without understanding the cases, it does 
not make sense the people could integrate the new information in their belief system and 
exhibit attitude change. 
To remedy these problems, I measure reception of case specific information and 
subsequent attitude change in a manner consistent with Zaller’s (1992) and Price and 
Zaller’s (1993) two-prong definition.15 Individuals receive the elite cue provided by the 
Court only when they are exposed to the decision and demonstrate that they understand 
it. This avoids the problems of assuming comprehension of the case from self-reported 
exposure while reducing the issues associated with over reporting. Although Hoekstra 
(2003) and Hoekstra and Segal (1996) use a similar method to asses whether individuals 
are aware of Court decisions, their analysis of Court driven attitude change is restricted 
only to individuals who heard of the decision. 
                                                 
14 Because the surveys used for post-decision samples are generally conducted near the decisions 
announcement, this makes potential over-reporting more likely. The possibility of over reporting is greatest 
immediately after the event takes place (Prior 2005).   
15 For much of his analysis, Zaller (1992) also assumes comprehension of new information from a proxy 
for exposure, one’s general level of political awareness, because of the vast number of elite cues possible in 
his study. Since I am primarily interested in the effect of receiving the elite cue provided by the justices, 
measuring reception of particular elite cues by tracking both self-reported exposure and comprehension of 
the message is a much more manageable task. This is similar to the approach of Price and Zaller (1993). 
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The shift to reception as measured by comprehension of the decision is an 
improvement over previous methods of isolating the effect of cases on public opinion. If 
the Court is one of the political elites capable of driving public opinion, then its influence 
should be evident among those who receive its message. If the Court is educating and 
persuading the public, individuals who receive the elite cue provided by the justices 
should move toward the Court’s articulated position. This leads to the comprehension 
hypothesis. 
The Comprehension Hypothesis: Individuals who receive the Court’s 
message should change their attitudes in the same direction as the justices’ 
cue. 
If those receiving Court cases do not respond differently than those missing the 
elite cue by the Court, then any attitude change on the issues associated with the decision 
are not related to the justices. This is similar to the positive response hypothesis 
associated with Dahl (1957), but there are several important differences. Unlike the 
scholars initially investigating Dahl’s theory, the analysis performed in Chapters 4 and 5 
is sensitive to other possible effects of receiving Court cases including stimulating a 
backlash against the justices’ articulated position. This approach also recognizes that the 
public as a whole should not exhibit attitude change after a Court decision, but that the 
Court effect should be present among individuals exposed to and understanding the case.   
We also know that the public’s response to new information is contingent on the 
character of the information flow from elites to the public (e.g. Zaller 1992, Brickman 
and Peterson 2006). One-sided information flows are typified by elite agreement leading 
to a mainstreaming effect where the public moves towards the elite consensus. Two-sided 
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information flows, on the other hand, present the public with elite disagreement, which 
leads to polarization according to one’s predispositions. This is applicable to the Court 
because it can present either a one-sided or two-sided information flow to the public 
through unanimous or divided opinions. When the Court is unanimous, it presents a one-
sided information flow that should be received by those understanding the cases. Non-
unanimous decisions like the ones in this study, however, present the public with a two-
sided information flow setting the stage for polarization among those receiving the 
Court’s message. This leads to the comprehension-polarization hypothesis. 
The Comprehension-Polarization Hypothesis: Those who receive the 
Court’s message in divided cases should be more likely to polarize than 
those who do not receive the message. 
While in line with the structural response hypothesis posited by others (e.g. 
Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998), this is a micro-level model 
allowing me to draw conclusions about individuals instead of groups. It also takes 
advantage of directly measuring reception of the Court’s message through comprehension 
of cases rather than assuming it based on self-reported exposure. 
Another way the Court may influence public opinion, consistent with Dahl’s 
(1957) work, is that it should be able to use its institutional legitimacy to validate one 
side of the policy debate. Credible sources should be more persuasive than non-credible 
ones (e.g. Fiske and Taylor 1991 and see generally Pornpitakpan 2004). This suggests 
that people should become more supportive of the position the Court adopts because of 
its special place in society as neutral arbiter of the law. While some experimental designs 
support this hypothesis (Clawson and Waltenberg 2003, Hoekstra 1995, Mondak 1994, 
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1992, 1990), survey research has generally not confirmed it (Marshall 1988, 
Marshall1989, Marshall 2004, Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998). 
Although previous findings are mixed, I contend that the Court should be able to increase 
support for its articulated position among those receiving its message who respect the 
institution, which leads to the comprehension-affinity for the Court hypothesis.16
The Comprehension-Affinity for the Court Hypothesis: Those who hold 
the Court in high regard and receive the elite cue provided by the justices 
should be more likely to adopt the Court’s articulated position than those 
with little respect for it or not receiving the message. 
Supreme Court cases do not occur in a political vacuum. The Court’s message is 
part of a broader elite debate that provides the public with important cues that can 
influence attitude change. The justices can stimulate non-Court elites by raising the place 
of an issue on the agenda (Gates 1999) and causing immediate, dramatic, and lasting 
changes in media coverage (Flemming, Bohte, and Wood 1997). If public opinion is 
influenced by elites in general, then scholars should incorporate the effect of both sets of 
elites—the justices and other political elites—into investigations of the Court’s ability to 
shape mass attitudes. The nature of the information environment and its influence on 
attitude change is largely overlooked by previous public law research except for 
Brickman and Peterson (2006). Examining the effect of both sets of elite cues is 
important because the positions of non-Court elites may reinforce or undermine the 
                                                 
16 There is debate over whether feeling thermometers appropriately measure support for the Court (see 
Calderia, Spence and Gibson 2003, Grosskopf and Mondak 1998). For example, a feeling thermometer 
does not differentiate between diffuse and specific support for the institution. For these reasons, I use the 
term affinity for the Court rather than support for it. However, the nature of the relationship between 
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message sent by the justices, which leads to the comprehension-elite alignment 
hypothesis. 
The Comprehension-Elite Alignment Hypothesis: The effect of receiving 
cases is conditionally related to the elite alignment on the issue associated 
with the decision. 
The conditional effect of receiving Supreme Court cases and consuming the 
broader elite debate varies along two dimensions—first, the level of agreement between 
the Court and other political elites; and second, the relationship between receiving elite 
cues and attitude change. Although specifying the conditional nature of the relationship 
among the Court’s cues in Webster, Stanford, Van Orden and McCreary and those 
provided by other political elites is the task of Chapter 3, it is useful to discuss the range 
of theoretical possibilities. 
The level of agreement between the Court and other political elites is important 
because Supreme Court cases are part of a much larger elite debate that can influence 
public opinion. If the broader elite debate is one-sided favoring one policy position over 
another, the Court’s message will either be consistent with the broader elite consensus or 
inconsistent with it. Alternatively, if the broader elite debate is two-sided, justices’ cue is 
incorporated into the set of evenly divided elite cues that the public receives. The effect 
of the broader elite debate should also be related to the functional form of the relationship 
between consumption of elite cues and attitude change, which may be linear (Gilens 
2001) or non-linear (Zaller 1992). 
                                                                                                                                                 
affinity and support for the Court should be the same. An individual that holds the Court in high esteem 
should be more likely to treat its decisions as legitimate ones. 
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One possibility is that the relationship between receiving new information by 
consuming elite cues and attitude change is linear (Gilens 2001). Several expectations 
flow from such a linear relationship, which are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
If the broader elite debate is one-sided and agrees with the position adopted by the 
Court, the effect of receiving of a Court case increases with the additional consumption 
of the pro-Court elite debate. On the other hand, the broader elite debate may be one-
sided and disagree with the Court decision. Increased consumption of an anti-Court 
broader elite debate should reduce the effect of receiving the case. Last, the broader elite 
debate can be two-sided that is relatively evenly divided between supporting and 
opposing the Court’s policy. Under this scenario, I again expect that the effect of 
receiving Court case is reduced by consuming the broader elite debate, but not as much as 
the one-sided anti-Court elite alignment. As an individual consumes more of the two-
sided elite debate, he/she is receiving an increased amount of countervailing messages, 
which should reduce the effect of the Court decision on one’s probability of attitude 
change. The presence of pro-Court messages should attenuate the effect of the anti-Court 
elite cues. 
It is also possible that the relationship between receiving new information and 
attitude change is non-linear. Zaller (1992) contends that this results from the 
combination of the probability of receiving new information from elites and accepting it. 
Individuals with low levels of political information are unlikely to receive the elite debate 
as they are unaware of the elite cues. Consequently, those with low political awareness 
will not exhibit signs of attitude change because they are missing the new cues provided 
21 
by elites. Individuals at the other end of the spectrum with high levels of political 
information consume the most amounts of the broader elite debate, but are also highly 
resistant to attitude change. Instead, the effect of elite cues on attitude change is greatest 
among those with moderate amounts of information as they consume the broader elite 
debate and are open to persuasion. 
Like Zaller, I contend that individuals with low levels of political information 
consume little of the broader elite debate. However, unlike Zaller, I do not assume that 
less sophisticated individuals are unaware of particular elite cues, which in this project 
are Court cases. If an individual consuming little or none of the broader elite debate 
actually receives the cue provided by the Court, then he/she should be relatively open to 
persuasion by the Court regardless of whether other political elites accept or reject the 
justices’ position. After all, this individual is receiving the message delivered by the 
Court and probably few other elite cues. The lack of countervailing messages should 
heighten the effect of receiving the Court’s message.  Similar to Zaller, individuals 
consuming moderate amounts elite cues are receiving both the Court’s message and the 
broader elite debate, and are open to attitude change. Here, whether the broader elite 
debate is one-sided or two-sided should influence how an individual responds to the case 
as he/she is receiving both sets of elite cues. Individuals with high political awareness 
scale should be the most likely to receive elite cues including the Court’s message, but 
they should be the most resistant to change regardless of the cue’s source. 
The conditional nature of these factors is illustrated in Figure 2.2 by the same 
three scenarios as above: a one-sided pro-Court broader elite debate, a one-sided anti-
Court broader elite debate, and a two-sided elite debate. 
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In the first scenario, the broader elite debate agrees with and reinforces the message sent 
by the Court. As consumption of the broader elite debate goes from low to moderate, the 
effect of receiving the Court’s message should be amplified by the pro-Court elite cues 
that are missed by those with less political awareness. As consumption of the pro-Curt 
elite debate climbs to higher levels, the effect of receiving Court cases should diminish as 
those with more political awareness are resistant to change. In the second scenario, the 
effect of receiving Court cases is relatively stable for those consuming little of the 
broader elite debate, but begins to diminish as one consumes more of the anti-Court 
debate. The effect of the Court decision will continue to diminish as consumption of the 
elite debate reaches the highest levels because those with the most awareness are also 
resistant to attitude change. In the third scenario with a two-sided elite broader elite 
debate, the effect of receiving Court cases on those consuming moderate amounts of the 
elite debate compared to those consuming little of it should be in-between the previous 
two scenarios. This results from the broader elite debate possessing elements that support 
and oppose the decision. Again, the effect of receiving the Court cases should decrease as 
one moves from moderate to high consumption of the broader, two-sided elite debate. 
Taken together, the combination of these two dimensions leads to a more nuanced 
understanding of how individuals receive the cues provided by the Court and other 
political elites. Situating the Court decision within this political context should shed light 
on whether receiving the Court or other political elites are driving public opinion, or if as 
suggested above, there is a joint effect between these two sources of elite cues on attitude 
change. Testing the linear and non-linear relationships for the effects of receiving the 
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Court’s cue and those of other elites will require different modeling strategies, which are 
discussed in later chapters. 
RECEIVING COURT CASES AND THE BROADER ELITE DEBATE: INFORMATION 
DELIVERED THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES 
So far, I have discussed the effect of receiving Court cases on public opinion and 
the important role of other elites in this process. Any investigation like this project must 
attend to how the public learns about cases and the broader elite alignment. Few 
individuals have direct exposure to the Court or other political elites. Instead, the public 
learns about the Court’s activity and broader elite debate from intermediaries, which are 
primarily the media.  
Unlike other political actors, the Supreme Court is almost completely restricted to 
using the media as a vehicle for informing any appreciable portion of the public of its 
message. Supreme Court justices do not have campaign commercials, visit constituents or 
make policy speeches.  Acting as an agenda setter, the Court can focus the media and 
other elites on the issues at stake in the cases (Flemming, Bohte and Wood 1997). By 
reporting the cases, the media link the public to the policies established by the Court. 
This process starts before the Court makes its decision. The media will preview salient 
cases, analyze the effect of the decision on the legal and political systems, and forecast 
future implications of the case. 
Although media coverage of the Court tends to be non-biased (Larson 1989, 
Larson 1995, Slotnick and Segal 1999), it also tends to be poor (Davis 1994, Haltom 
1999). For example, television news can get important aspects of the case wrong 
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(Slotnick and Segal 1999) and the quality of reporting varies among news sources as 
journalists focus on the future political implications of the case rather than explaining 
justices’ positions (Hoekstra 2003). Media coverage of the Court and its decisions is far 
from ideal, but it is capable of connecting the public to some of its activities. 
Along with the message sent by the justices, the media present the public with the 
broader elite alignment on issues associated with Court cases. The nature of the broader 
elite debate has consequences for attitude change. The public’s perception of the broader 
elite debate is shaped by the choices made by the media (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). This 
includes whether the public receives a one- or two-sided information flow from elites.  
The nature of this debate should be integrated into studies of the Court’s ability to shape 
public opinion. Otherwise, an important aspect in the dynamics of attitude change is left 
out of the analysis: the effect of non-Court elites on public opinion. As discussed earlier, 
individuals may respond different to the cues provided by political elites and the amount 
of the elite debate consumed may increase or decrease the probability of attitude change. 
Hoekstra (2003) takes the important step of investigating whether the media reports 
cases, but does not account for the nature of the information flow from both sets of elites 
to the public—that is, whether the Court decision is reinforced or undermined by other 
political elites. By assessing the information flow from the Court and other elites to the 
public, my approach fits the Court’s message within political context and is more 
nuanced than previous research designs. 
I now turn to the data and methods that comprise the empirical investigation into 
the efficacy of reception as a measure of the Court’s influence on public opinion. 
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DATA 
The empirical analysis for this project is conducted in three stages—(1) detailing 
reception of the elite cues provided by the Court and other political elites, (2) the effect of 
receiving Webster and Stanford on abortion and death penalty attitudes, and (3) the effect 
receiving Van Orden and McCreary on attitudes toward publicly displaying the Ten 
Commandments. The analysis in Chapters Three through Five rely on data from three 
sources: news reports on the cases, the 1989 National Election Studies Pilot Study (here 
after “the 1989 Pilot”), and an original quasi-experiment conducted in Austin, Texas 
during summer 2005 (here after “the 2005 Experiment”). 
Media Reporting on the Cases 
The data used to assess the broader elite alignment on Webster, Stanford, Van 
Orden and McCreary include news reports on these cases in the year before they were 
decided. The two primary data sources are Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe and 
Vanderbilt Television News Archive.  For Webster and Stanford, the data include all news 
stories and editorials by the New York Times and ABC News about the cases from July 1, 
1988 to July 31, 1989 in the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. For NBC News and CBS 
News, I relied on data provided by the Vanderbilt Television News Archive because the 
transcripts for these broadcasts were not available on Lexis-Nexis.17 The relevant news 
stories were selected using the following search terms in the full-text of media reports. 
For Webster, the search terms were “Webster” and “abortion”; for Stanford, the search 
terms were “death penalty” and “Stanford” or “Wilkins”. This reflects the consolidation 
                                                 
17 The Vanderbilt Television News Archive provides summaries of news stories instead of transcripts. This 
choice has consequences because the summaries are not as detailed as transcripts. However, the summaries 
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of the two death penalty cases and the possibility of reports mentioning one case without 
the other. 
For Van Orden and McCreary, the data are provided solely by Lexis-Nexis. The 
search period was June 27, 2004 to June 28, 2005, which encompasses the year before the 
decisions were announced. Since I collected original data by conducting a quasi-
experiment in Austin, Texas, I included a local newspaper, The Austin American 
Statesman. I did not collect data from local television news broadcasts.18
The 1989 Pilot 
Measuring the Court’s influence on public opinion poses problems for scholars 
because researchers generally do not include the Supreme Court on surveys; these 
problems are well documented by others (e.g. Caldeira 1991, Hoekstra 2003). Most 
surveys are designed to investigate research questions about campaigns, elections and 
representation. The relatively few surveys that include the Court are generally not well 
suited to investigating attitude change because they present a snapshot of public opinion 
at a given time. Those that are panel studies tend not to include Court cases or are not 
timed to capture the impact of a particular decision. This renders much of the existing 
survey data inappropriate for studying the Court’s impact on public opinion. Some 
suitable existing data does exist and I take advantage of one such data set in this 
dissertation, the 1989 Pilot.  
                                                                                                                                                 
did include the names and organizations of elites presented in the stories. This should be sufficient to assess 
the nature of the broader elite alignment for Webster and Stanford. 
18 The searches were performed using the full text option and the search term was “Ten Commandments”. 
The analysis includes only the reports referencing at least one of the decisions. The data include news 
reports and editorials. 
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There are many advantages of the 1989 Pilot for studying Court-driven attitude 
change. First, it is a panel study. Panel studies are well suited for studying changes in 
public opinion because researchers can track attitudes of the same individuals over time. 
Second, the survey is conveniently timed well to capture the effect of Webster and 
Stanford on public opinion as a portion of the study was conducted just after the 
decisions were announced. Third, the survey includes items measuring reception of 
Webster and Stanford. Fourth, it is drawn from a nationally representative sample of 
adults. Last, the 1989 Pilot, like other NES surveys, contains a host of relevant political 
attributes and demographic characteristics that are relevant to receiving cases and attitude 
change. These qualities make the 1989 Pilot a valuable resource for analyzing reception 
rates for Webster and Stanford (Chapter 3) as well as whether receiving the cases 
influences abortion and death penalty attitudes (Chapter 4). 
The 1989 Pilot is a four-wave panel study. The first and second waves are the pre- 
and post-election 1988 NES survey, which provides the respondents’ pre-Webster 
abortion positions, pre-Stanford death penalty positions, political attributes, and 
demographic characteristics. The third wave is a sub-sample of individuals completing 
the 1988 NES panel survey and was conducted immediately after Webster and Stanford 
from July 6 to August 1, 1989. Stanford was decided on June 26, 1989 and Webster was 
decided on July 6, 1989. The most important items in the third wave measure respondent 
abortion and death penalty positions as well as separate items for receiving the Court’s 
elite cues in Webster and Stanford.  During the fourth wave, respondents from the third 
wave were re-interviewed between September 6 and October 6, 1989. The respondents 
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were again asked for their abortion positions and whether they understood Webster. The 
fourth wave does not measure whether individuals received Stanford. 
The four-waves of the 1989 NES Pilot permit estimation of any short- and long-
term Court effect on abortion attitudes. Short-term change refers to the difference 
between an individual’s pre-Webster abortion position in the 1988 NES survey and 
his/her first post-Webster abortion position in July 1989. Long-term change refers to the 
difference between an individual’s pre-Webster abortion position and his/her second post-
Webster abortion position in Wave 4 from September to October 1989. Comparing the 
effect of short- and long-term reception on short- and long-term attitude change permits 
analysis of the durability of Court-driven attitude change. Please note that comprehension 
of Webster and Stanford are measured separately in the third wave of the panel study. 
Since the 1989 NES Pilot does not include a long-term measure of understanding the 
case, I can only estimate short-term effects of receiving Stanford on death penalty 
attitudes. 
The 2005 Experiment 
While the 1989 Pilot illustrates that quality data to investigate Court-drive public 
opinion exists, such data sets are rare. In order to estimate the effect of receiving Van 
Orden and McCreary on attitude change, I decided to conduct my own quasi-experiment 
that gave me control over several problematic aspects of using existing data: survey 
timing, questionnaire content, and a design conducive to examining individual-level 
attitude change. 
Similar to the 1989 Pilot, the data collected in 2005 is a two-wave panel study 
designed to book end the cases. The pre-decision surveys were conducted between June 
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17 and June 23, 2005. The Court announced Van Orden and McCreary on June 27, 2005. 
The post-decision surveys were administered after the cases were announced between 
June 28 and June 30, 2005. The proximity of the surveys to the Court cases should reduce 
contamination from other events. The pre-decision survey portion of 2005 Experiment 
provides similar personal characteristics as the pre-decision 1989 Pilot. The post-decision 
survey includes items to measure reception of Van Orden and McCreary. Similar items 
are rarely included on surveys.  
Experimental designs generally offer a high degree of internal validity and have 
some problems with external validity (Johnson and Joslyn 1995). The quasi-experimental 
design employed in this study takes advantage of some of the internal validity of 
experiments while providing a degree of external validity. Unlike a traditional 
experiment, I did not randomly assign the treatment, reception of Van Orden and 
McCreary, which does pose certain problems like loss of control over the treatment 
condition. Instead, I opted to measure attitudes on publicly displaying the Ten 
Commandments before and after the decisions. The internal validity comes from 
controlling the survey timing and content, but this is reduced by not randomly assigning 
the treatment. Instead, to gain external validity, I measured reception of the cases under 
as normal conditions as possible at the expense of control over treatment conditions. This 
was an effort to replicate real world conditions of learning about the decisions, as I did 
not artificially expose the subjects to the Court’s message. These steps reduce rather than 
eliminate the internal and external validity concerns of this research design.19
                                                 
19 This approach, of course, creates some problems like generalizing from a college student sample. I feel 
that the trade off between internal and external validity is acceptable because of the data problems 
associated with this research question. 
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The sample is drawn from college students in Austin, Texas attending the 
University of Texas at Austin and a large urban community college, which should 
increase sample diversity. The sample consists of 132 students drawn from four 
Introduction to American Politics classes and one non-public law upper division course. 
Three of the Introduction to American Politics classes were drawn from the large urban 
community college and the remaining classes came from the University of Texas at 
Austin. Eighty-three percent of the sample attended the University of Texas at Austin and 
17% were students at the large urban community college. The classes had not reached 
constitutional law, the US Supreme Court, or the judiciary more broadly, and had not 
discussed the cases at the time of the experiment. As one might expect, the sample is 
younger and has more Democrats than national samples. The sample is balanced with 
respect to gender and has some racial as well as religious diversity. Summary statistics 
for the sample are included in the Appendix. 
Combining existing and original data helps gain traction on whether the Court can 
influence public opinion. This also helps me get around some of the survey timing and 
item problems associated with using existing data. Using two different research designs, a 
panel study and a quasi-experiment, add to this analysis by taking advantage of two 
approaches. 
Chapter 3 begins the empirical investigation into whether the Court is driving 
attitudes on abortion, the death penalty, or publicly displaying the Ten Commandments. 
This chapter focuses on the cues provided by the Court and other elites as well as 
reception of these messages. 
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Chapter 3: The Cues Sent by the Court and Other Political Elites, and 
the Individuals Receiving the Messages  
The previous chapter established the theoretical framework for studying Court 
driven attitude change. This chapter begins the empirical investigation into whether and 
how the Court is influencing public opinion by exploring reception of cases. In order for 
the Court to influence public opinion, people must be aware of the elite cues it provides. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is also necessary to place the Court in political context by 
accounting for another set of cues that can influence public opinion: the cues sent by 
other political elites about the cases and issues associated with the decisions. The central 
question this chapter is: what cues do the Court and other political elites send to the 
public, and who receives these cues? 
While previous scholars have investigated whether the Court is driving attitude 
change and how public opinion can shape judicial decision-making, there has been less 
research on measuring case awareness. This is surprising given the scholarly consensus 
that awareness of cases is a requirement for the Court to influence public opinion. To 
understand the key variable of case awareness, I continue to combine the theoretical 
perspectives and methodological approaches developed by researchers in public law and 
American politics more generally. 
This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I establish the elite cues sent by the 
Court in Webster, Stanford, Van Orden and McCreary to a potentially persuadable 
public. Second, I detail the nature of the broader elite alignment on the cases and issues 
associated with them as it may influence attitude change. This entails original content 
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analysis of media reports for the presentation of elite cues to the public. Third, I develop 
reception as an improved method of establishing awareness of Court decisions compared 
to those commonly employed by public law scholars. By reception, I mean individuals 
being exposed to Court cases and understanding the information presented by the 
justices. Reception improves on previous methods of assessing case awareness such as 
media consumption, self-reported exposure to the case, or the combination of case and 
survey timing. Last, I investigate the individual-level characteristics that increase the 
probability of receiving Court cases and discuss the results. 
THE ELITE CUES SENT BY THE COURT 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
At the center of Webster is a Missouri law and its sections regulating abortion. 
Many scholars viewed this case as the first real chance to overturn Roe because of 
changes to the Court’s composition making it more hostile to the abortion precedent (e.g. 
Epstein and Kobylka 1992, Graber 1996). The controversy around the case generated a 
then record number of amicus briefs demonstrating the importance of the case to interest 
groups and activists (Tribe 1990). 
The Missouri statute contained several sections regulating abortion that pro-
choice activists asserted violated a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion while pro-
life activists viewed the same provisions favorably. First, the preamble of the Missouri 
law declared that life begins at conception. Second, the law prevents public facilities and 
employees from performing abortions unless the procedure was needed to save the 
mother’s life. Third, public funding and employees could not be used to encourage 
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women to seek abortions. Fourth, fetal viability tests would be performed starting in the 
20th week of a pregnancy.  
In Webster, a divided Court refuses to overrule Roe while at the same time 
upholding Missouri’s increased state-level regulation of abortion. The nature of Webster 
poses some problems for categorizing the elite cue provided by the Court to the public. 
The case does not neatly fit into the categories of liberal or conservative because it stakes 
out a middle ground (Gates 1999). It was a disappointment to those wanting to overrule 
Roe like Justice Scalia and reaffirm it like Justice Blackmun (Greenhouse 2005, Tushnet 
2006). The alignment of the justices adds to the difficult nature of Webster as no single 
position garnered a majority.  However, by approving Missouri’s restrictions on abortion, 
the Court sent the public an elite cue that abortion should be permitted in fewer 
circumstances. Individuals who receive Webster should understand the decision allowed 
for increased regulation of abortion. 
Stanford v. Kentucky 
The central question in Stanford was whether imposing the death penalty on 
convicted murderers who were 16 or 17 years old when they committed the crime 
violates the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. By a 
5-4 margin, the Court ruled that executing convicted murderers who were minors when 
the crime was committed did not necessarily violate the evolving standards of American 
society. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reached this conclusion based on the 
number of death penalty states permitting capital punishment of 16 or 17 year old 
offenders and the lack of a national law banning executions of offenders under 18 years 
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old for all federal crimes. He also rejected polling data as a method of establishing a 
national consensus against the death penalty as applied in this case. 
Similar to Webster, the decision resulted in a divided Court, but figuring out the 
elite cue provided by the Court in Stanford is less complicated. The easily identifiable 
split between the majority and dissenting opinions sends a clearer signal to the public 
than the plurality decision in Webster. By ruling that evolving standards of American 
society have not reached a consensus against imposing the death penalty on convicted 
murders 16 years old or older, the Court signals the public that the capital punishment is 
acceptable. This presents the public with an elite cue that the death penalty is acceptable 
in general and for this particular situation. Individuals receiving the Court’s message 
should be aware of the pro-capital punishment orientation of the decision. 
Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary v. ACLU 
Van Orden and McCreary both involve the constitutionality of publicly displaying 
the Ten Commandments. The Court heard oral arguments and decided the cases on the 
same days. Like Webster and Stanford, Van Orden and McCreary satisfy Epstein & 
Segal’s (2000) test of case salience by appearing on the front page of The New York 
Times. Also like Webster and Stanford, multiple justices wrote opinions in both cases 
including published dissents. However, the fact patterns, case origins, and outcomes are 
different for Van Orden and McCreary. 
Van Orden originates from Austin, Texas where the Fraternal Order of Eagles 
donated a monument of the Ten Commandments placed on the State Capitol’s grounds. 
This display appears with other historical monuments and had been on the grounds for 40 
years. In the opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the display 
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did not violate the First Amendment because the context of the statue had sufficient 
historical meaning in addition to its religious content.  
At issue in McCreary was the public display of the Ten Commandments in some 
Kentucky courthouses. Unlike Van Orden, the Court struck down the Kentucky displays. 
Justice Souter discussed the history and context of the display in the majority opinion. A 
framed copy of the Ten Commandments was originally the only document in the display. 
Next, the county added other religious passages and a third round of alterations included 
secular documents to illustrate the foundations of Kentucky law. Although other 
documents appeared in the display, Justice Souter concluded that the history of the 
display indicates the purpose was to advance religion. Consequently, the display violated 
the First Amendment. 
The different outcomes of the cases lead to two sets of elite cues. For Van Orden, 
the Court signals the public that certain Ten Commandments displays are acceptable 
while in McCreary, the Court indicates that other displays are not constitutional. 
Reception of these cases is measured separately to reflect the divergent outcomes. 
Individuals receiving each case should be able to correctly identify whether the particular 
display was approved or not. Awareness of each case does not hinge on receiving the 
justices’ message in the other. 
In Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and McCreary, the Court provides powerful 
elite cues to a potentially persuadable public that is capable of revising its attitudes. 
However, the elite cues sent by the justices are not the only ones the public receives. 
Court decisions are delivered to the public by the media along with the positions of other 
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political elites. The content and nature of the broader elite debates surrounding these 
cases are the focus of the next section. 
ASSESSING THE BROADER ELITE DEBATE  
The elite debates surrounding Court cases, which the media presents to the public, 
receive little attention from public law scholars investigating Court-driven attitude 
change. For example, researchers who focus on whether Court decisions influence the 
structure of public opinion compare pre-decision samples with post-decision samples of 
individuals who report being exposed to the cases, but do not address the broader elite 
debate (e.g. Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998, Brickman and Peterson 
2006). This approach leaves out two important aspects of this project, whether 
individuals reporting exposure actually understood the Court’s message and the role that 
other political elites play in attitude change. Other scholars take the important step of 
investigating whether the media reports cases (e.g. Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Hoekstra 
2000, Hoekstra 2003), but again do not account for the nature of the information flow 
from elites to the public. By assessing this information flow, my approach fits the Court’s 
message within political context and is more nuanced than previous attempts to explain 
how the public responds to decisions. 
In order to assess the broader elite alignment surrounding Webster, Stanford, Van 
Orden, and McCreary, I content analyze media reports related to the cases.  The unit of 
analysis is the news story. The two primary data sources are Lexis-Nexis Academic 
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Universe and Vanderbilt Television News Archive.  For Webster and Stanford,20 the data 
include all news stories and editorials by the New York Times and ABC News about the 
cases from July 1, 1988 to July 31, 1989 in the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. For NBC 
News and CBS News, I relied on data provided by the Vanderbilt Television News 
Archive because the transcripts for these broadcasts were not available on Lexis-Nexis.21
For Van Orden and McCreary, the data are provided solely by Lexis-Nexis. The 
search period was June 27, 2004 to June 28, 2005, which encompasses the year before the 
decisions were announced. Since I collected original data by conducting a quasi-
experiment in Austin, Texas, I included a local newspaper, The Austin American 
Statesman. I did not collect data from local television news broadcasts.22
To assess the elite alignment surrounding Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and 
McCreary, I code the data for the number of elites quoted on each side of the issues 
associated with the cases. For the purpose of this study, political elites include party 
leaders, elected officials, policymaking bodies like Congress or state legislatures, 
members of interest groups, or individuals presented as experts on the topic. If elites from 
one side of the debate, for example anti-death penalty interest groups leaders, are 
reported far more often than those with opposing views, then the message will be 
                                                 
20 The search used the full text option and the terms for Webster were “Webster” and “abortion”; the search 
terms for Stanford were “death penalty” and “Stanford” or “Wilkins”. This reflects the consolidation of 
Stanford and Wilkins as some stories may only reference the name of one case. The data include both news 
items and editorials. 
21 The Vanderbilt Television News Archive provides summaries of news stories instead of transcripts. This 
choice has consequences because the summaries are not as detailed as transcripts. However, the summaries 
did include the names and organizations of elites presented in the stories. This should be sufficient to assess 
the nature of the broader elite alignment for Webster and Stanford. 
22 The searches were performed using the full text option and the search term was “Ten Commandments”. 
The analysis includes only the reports referencing at least one of the decisions. The data include news 
reports and editorials. 
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considered one-sided. However, I expect that the elite debate surrounding the cases will 
be two-sided. These issues are frequently trumpeted as controversial topics with 
energized activist elites on both sides. Also, the media has a norm of balance and non-
biased reporting on the Court, suggesting that elites each side of debate will be quoted 
(Larson 1989, Larson 1995, Slotnick and Segal 1999). To determine whether the broader 
elite debate is one- or two-sided, I perform a difference of means test to establish whether 
more elites are quoted on one side of the issue rather than the other. 
The results of the content analysis are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 indicates that the media covered each case, but paid more attention to 
some decisions than others. Webster and publicly displaying the Ten Commandments 
received more attention from national news organizations than Stanford did. In the year 
prior to Webster, 60 stories involved the case. Fifty-two of these stories appeared in the 
New York Times and national television news programs presented eight. Across print and 
television news organizations, the stories quoted an equal number of pro-choice and pro-
life elites. On average, 5.1 elites were quoted on each side of the abortion issue, which 
indicates the media presented the public with a two-sided elite debate. 
Stanford and the death penalty received less coverage than Webster and abortion. 
Stanford received roughly the same amount of coverage by the New York Times and the 
three major network news telecasts. Although the average number of anti-death penalty 
elites quoted in these stories eclipses the average number of pro-death penalty elites 3.6 
to 4.0 per story, this difference is not statistically significant. Consequently, while the 
media coverage of Stanford and the death penalty may slightly favor anti-death penalty 
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elites, the broader elite debate presented to the public is two-sided and consistent with my 
expectations of balanced coverage. 
From June 27, 2004 to June 28, 2005, 35 news stories included references to the 
Ten Commandments and the Court’s activity in Van Orden or McCreary. In addition to 
the 13 New York Times stories, the local newspaper reported on the cases eight times. 
Whether in print or on television, these stories on average quoted elites on both sides of 
the Ten Commandments debate creating what appears to be a two-sided information 
flow. The average number of pro-display elites quoted in each story, however, exceeded 
the number of anti-display elites in each of the five sources. For the entire sample, an 
average story included 3.3 pro-display elites compared to 2.5 anti-display elites. This 
difference is statistically significant. Although anti-display elites are quoted in each news 
source, the overall nature of the elite discourse delivered to the public by the media 
slightly favors publicly displaying the Ten Commandments.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the nature of the broader elite debate has important 
consequences for the probability that an individual will exhibit attitude change on the 
issue associated with the case. The specific implications of the two-sided broader elite 
messages in Webster and Stanford as well as the more one-sided nature of the elite debate 
regarding the Ten Commandments displays on Court driven attitude change are discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The media presented the public with two-sided elite messages on each of the three 
issues. There are several options to measure consumption of the broader elite debate. One 
approach is to rely on self-reported media consumption, but this is subject to over 
reporting (e.g. Prior 2005). Instead, I will use one’s general level of political information 
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as a proxy for consumption of the broader elite debate. As demonstrated by Price and 
Zaller (1993), political information is a better predictor of receiving media messages 
including the elite debate on the cases. This is also similar to the way that Zaller (1992) 
assesses consumption of elite cues. In the next section, I address the problems with 
previous measures of case awareness and discuss improved methods of identifying those 
who received the Court’s message.   
MEASURING AWARENESS OF COURT CASES BY RECEPTION 
There are several methods to assess whether an individual is aware of Court 
decisions. Some scholars have used survey and case timing as a proxy for being aware of 
Court decisions (Barnum 1985, Marshall 1989, Brickman and Peterson 2006). Murphy 
and Tannenhaus (1968) relied on an individual’s ability to name cases they like or 
dislike. Other scholars rely on self-reported exposure measured by individuals indicating 
they heard of recent decisions in certain issue areas (Franklin and Koskai 1989, Johnson 
and Martin 1998, Franklin and Kosaki 1995, Brickman and Peterson 2006, Scott and 
Saunders 2006) or knowing that a case has been decided (Franklin, Kosaki, and Kritzer 
1993). These methods are problematic. Relying on survey and case timing assumes that 
individuals are aware of the cases rather than measuring it directly. Self-reported 
exposure creates two related problems—assuming that people understand the information 
provided by the Court and over reporting. 
Measuring reception by comprehension of the decisions is an improved method of 
determining whether an individual is aware of the elite cue provided by the Court. Other 
scholars have used this approach (Price and Zaller 1993, Hoekstra and Segal 1996, 
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Hoekstra 2000, Hoekstra 2003). Scholars using reception first determine self-reported 
exposure to the case and next whether the individual understood the decision. Franklin, 
Kosaki, and Krtizer (1993) also discuss this method, but their attention to whether 
individuals in their sample understood several Court cases is cursory.23 While these 
scholars assert the benefits of using specific knowledge about Court cases to measure 
awareness, this method is less common than other approaches.24
Given the “conventional wisdom” asserted by several prominent public law 
scholars of a public largely unaware of most Court cases (e.g. Segal and Spaeth 1993, 
Segal, Spaeth and Benesh 2006), one would expect that people are rarely familiar with 
decisions regardless of how it is measured. After all, the public routinely performs poorly 
on surveys when asked about the Court and has trouble identifying justices including the 
Chief Justice of the United States (e.g. Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996, Baum 2007). A 
popular recent Zogby International poll illustrates this perspective in a way aimed more 
at entertainment than adding to our understanding of what influences case awareness—
“77% of U.S. residents could name two of Snow White’s dwarfs, whereas only 24% 
could name two Supreme Court justices” (United Press International 2006).  
There is growing evidence, however, that the conventional wisdom 
underestimates the ability of the public to follow Court actions. Franklin and Kosaki 
(1991) find 85% of a sample drawn from St. Louis, Missouri remembered Webster.25 
                                                 
23 While Franklin, Kosaki and Krtizer (1993) examine the factors that systematically influence knowing the 
Court has decided a case, they do not investigate the same for understanding Court decisions. Instead, they 
note reception rates at the end of the paper. 
24 Hoekstra (2003) and Hoekstra and Segal (1996) do not compare those who receive cases to those 
missing the justices’ cues when examining Court driven-attitude change, which is a key difference between 
their approach and the one I employ in Chapters 4 and 5. 
25 This figure is quoted from Franklin, Kosaki, and Krtizer (1993). 
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Other scholars also found that salient Court decisions have deeper penetration into the 
public’s consciousness than the conventional wisdom allowed including up to 40% of 
national survey respondents reporting exposure to cases (e.g. Murphy and Tanenhaus 
1968, Franklin, Kosaki and Kritzer 1993, Scott and Saunders 2006). Local reception rates 
for cases in the region from which they originated can range from 21% to 82% (e.g. 
Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Hoekstra 2000, Hoekstra 2003). While awareness of Court 
decisions is often less than other political events or actors (Franklin Kosaki and Krtizer 
1993, Price and Zaller 1993), it is higher than the conventional wisdom allows. 
This begs a question: since several scholars have established that the public is 
aware of certain cases, why is it necessary to revisit this research area? I contend that 
there are at least three reasons: the use of faulty measures of case awareness, improper 
conceptualization of who should be receiving elite cues including Court decisions, and 
mixed findings for the factors influencing case awareness. 
First, some public law scholars rely on flawed measures of case awareness 
resulting in assuming reception rather than measuring it such as self-reported exposure 
(Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998, Brickman and Peterson 2006, 
Scott and Saunders 2006) or survey timing (Barnum 1985, Marshall 1988, Marshall 
1989,  Brickman and Peterson 2006). As noted earlier, this results in inflated estimates of 
case awareness. This prevents proper identification of individuals who actually received 
the elite cue provided by the Court. Measuring reception of cases by comprehension of 
the decision avoids these problems. 
Second, public law scholars routinely point to media consumption and education 
as proxies for receiving elite messages like Court decisions (Franklin, Kosaki and Kritzer 
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1993, Franklin and Kosaki 1995, Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Hoekstra 2000, Hoekstra 
2003). The media certainly play an important role in the public’s awareness of cases 
because it is the only realistic way for individuals to learn about Court decisions. If the 
media do not report on a case, then the public will not be aware of it. However, political 
scientists outside of public law have demonstrated that self-reported media consumption 
and education do not capture exposure to and understanding of the messages presented by 
the media as well as one’s general level of political information (e.g. Price and Zaller 
1993, Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996). By overlooking the role of political information in 
the dynamics of understanding the messages sent by the media, public law scholars are 
missing a large aspect of case awareness. 
The third reason to return to assessing case awareness are the mixed findings for 
the individual-level factors influencing knowledge about Court decisions across the 
public law literature. Price and Zaller (1993) demonstrate that political information is a 
powerful determinant of receiving Webster and Stanford. Scott and Saunders (2006) also 
find that general political knowledge is related to self-reported exposure to a case about 
the Ten Commandments in 2005, but not exposure to three other cases that year.26 Some 
scholars also find news consumption to increase awareness of cases (Franklin and Kosaki 
1995, Scott and Saunders 2006), but Hoekstra’s (2000, 2003) results for the same 
variable are decidedly mixed. Other inconsistently performing variables include gender, 
education, and support for the Court. 
Some of the inconsistencies may result from the measure of awareness employed 
in the studies. As noted above, relying on self-reported exposure (e.g. Scott and Saunders 
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2006) is problematic because it assumes people understand the Court cases. One way this 
problem manifests itself is over reporting. The mixed results may result from many 
public law scholars overlooking variables identified by others (e.g. Zaller 1992, Price and 
Zaller 1993, Delli-Caripini and Keeter 1996) as important predictors of knowledge 
specific political events. Investigating awareness of Court decisions also suffers from a 
lack of quality data on awareness of Court decisions. Few surveys include appropriate 
items to investigate this research question, as surveys are not generally geared toward the 
Court or its schedule. Consequently, it is necessary to revisit awareness of Court 
decisions measured by reception and the individual characteristics that influence 
understanding cases.27
Data and Methods 
The investigation of the individual-level influences on receiving cases begins by 
establishing reception rates for Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and McCreary. The data 
for Webster and Stanford are the 1989 Pilot, which is a four-wave panel study. The first 
and second waves are the pre- and post-election 1988 NES survey that provides 
respondent political attributes and demographic characteristics, which are important in 
the next section of this chapter. In this section, I focus on the third wave of the 1989 
Pilot, which is a sub-sample of individuals completing the 1988 NES panel survey and 
was conducted immediately after Webster and Stanford from July 6 to August 1, 1989.28 
The third wave of the 1989 Pilot provides items to determine self-reported exposure to 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 Scott and Saunders (2006) do not distinguish between self-reported exposure to Van Orden and 
McCreary. Instead, their exposure item is about a case involving the Ten Commandments. 
27 Price and Zaller (1993) perform similar analysis for Webster and Stanford using whether a respondent 
understood the decisions to measure awareness, but I am not simply relying on their analysis.  
28 Stanford was decided on June 26, 1989 and Webster was decided on July 6, 1989. 
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Webster and Stanford as well as reception of the cases measured by whether an individual 
understood the decisions. During the fourth wave, respondents from the third wave were 
re-interviewed between September 6 and October 6, 1989. These individuals were again 
asked the same items to gather self-reported exposure and reception rates of Webster. The 
fourth wave does not measure whether individuals received Stanford. 
The data for Van Orden and McCreary are provided by the 2005 Experiment. 
Similar to the 1989 Pilot, the data collected in 2005 is a two-wave panel study designed 
to book end the cases. The pre-decision surveys were conducted between June 17 and 
June 23, 2005. The Court announced Van Orden and McCreary on June 27, 2005. The 
post-decision surveys were administered after the cases were announced between June 28 
and June 30, 2005. The pre-decision survey portion of 2005 Experiment provides similar 
personal characteristics as the pre-decision 1989 Pilot. Self-reported exposure and 
reception of the cases are derived from the post-decision surveys. The proximity of the 
surveys to the Court cases should reduce contamination from other events. 
The two datasets allow measurement of receiving the cases by determining 
whether an individual understood the decision. Reception of Webster, Stanford, Van 
Orden, and McCreary are coded in a similar fashion from two survey items. The first 
question tracks self-reported exposure and the second determines whether an individual 
understood the decision. Together, these items allow me to determine who has received 
the Court’s message and who has missed it. The items measuring self-reported exposure 
are close-ended and prompt respondents for whether they remember a recent case about 
abortion, the death penalty, or publicly displaying the Ten Commandments. The exposure 
items are as follows: 
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Webster: Have you heard or read any stories about a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision this summer on abortion? 
Stanford: Have you heard or read any stories about a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision this summer on the death penalty? 
Van Orden: Have you heard of or read about a U.S. Supreme Court case 
this year about removing the Ten Commandments from display on a state 
capitol? 
McCreary: Have you heard of or read about a U.S. Supreme Court case 
this year about removing the Ten Commandments from display in a 
courtroom? 
Individuals responding “no” or “don’t know” to the exposure items are coded as 
not receiving the Court’s message. While some previous scholars tended to stop here and 
consider only those who report exposure to the cases as receiving the Court’s message, I 
take the additional step of assessing if an individual can put the case outcome in his/her 
own words. Individuals responding “yes” to the exposure items are next prompted by 
open-ended questions asking them to describe the Court’s decision. Only those 
individuals who report exposure to the case and demonstrate that they understood the 
decision are coded as receiving the Court’s message. 
Due to the important role that understanding a decision plays in determining 
reception of the Court’s message, it is necessary to discuss how the open-ended items for 
the cases are coded. For Webster and Stanford, even though the comprehension items are 
open-ended, I did not code reception directly from respondent answers. Instead, I recoded 
categories provided by the NES. Examples of correct answers offered by individuals who 
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are coded as receiving Webster range from basic descriptions like “upheld Roe v. 
Wade/didn’t overturn Roe v. Wade” to more sophisticated categories mentioning specific 
details about the provisions of Missouri law at issue in the case. The response categories 
for Stanford have a similar range of detail. 
For abortion and Webster, the self-reported exposure and comprehension items 
appeared immediately after Webster and several months later in the 1989 Pilot, which 
allows me to determine short- and long-term reception rates. Short-term exposure and 
reception rates were measured between July 6 and August 1, 1989. Long-term exposure 
and reception rates were measured between September 1 and October 1, 1989. Short- and 
long-term reception rates are coded in the same manner. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize 
the categories used to code respondents as having either received or missed the Court’s 
cues in the cases.29
Since I conducted the quasi-experiment to collect data on the effect of Van Orden 
and McCreary on attitude change, I determined whether an individual received the 
Court’s message in either case. In order to be coded as receiving the cases, correct 
answers for Van Orden had to recognize that the Court approved of the Texas display. 
For McCreary, the answers must include a reference to the Court ruling against the 
Kentucky display.30 Examples of individuals receiving Van Orden include “They can be 
                                                 
29 The reception rates for Webster and Stanford below are consistent with those found by Price and Zaller 
(1993). Although the results are the almost identical, I did not rely on Price and Zaller’s (1993) coding for 
“recall” of these decisions. The consistent results provide some degree of confidence in my coding scheme 
as I independently arrived at the same reception or “recall” rates as Price and Zaller. One reason for coding 
the data independently is that Price and Zaller did not include their coding rules for whether an individual 
recalled the cases. 
30 The content analysis was conducted only by the author. Consequently, inter-coder reliability statistics are 
not available. 
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displayed outside [of the Texas State Capitol]” and those who distinguished the Texas 
case from McCreary like “they kept [the Ten Commandments] in Texas and rejected it in 
Kentucky” or detailed responses similar to the arguments presented by the Court, “The 
Court decided that the commandments could stay [in Texas]. One of the reasons was that 
they had been there for 40 years, 2 generations…and they were one of many 
monuments.” Examples of incorrect summaries of Van Orden include “displaying the 
Ten Commandments violates the establishment clause” and for McCreary, “in Alabama, 
I believe the Court removed the commandments”. Again, individual responding, “don’t 
know” or refusing to answer are coded as missing the case. 
Results 
Table 3.4 presents rates of self-reported exposure and reception as measured by 
understanding the decisions for Webster, Stanford, Van Orden and McCreary. 
The data in Table 3.4 generally indicate that substantial portions of the samples 
reported exposure to the Court cases. For three of the four cases, self-reported exposure 
exceeds 50% and it reaches 80% for Webster immediately after the case, but this falls to 
69% a few months later. Self-reported exposure to Van Orden is 76%, which comes close 
to the immediate exposure rate for Webster. Exposure rates for McCreary and Stanford 
are lower than the other two cases at 53% and 34%, respectively. 
As discussed earlier, much of the existing work on awareness of Court decisions 
relies on self-reported exposure, which I contend is problematic. Self-reported exposure 
should be a starting rather than ending point. The problems with self-reported exposure 
are illustrated by comparing the number of individuals claiming they heard of a case to 
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those actually understanding it. While 80% of the respondents indicated hearing about an 
abortion case immediately after Webster, 52% of individuals demonstrated reception by 
correctly describing the case outcome. Shifting to the long-term recall of the case, 
exposure drops to 69% while comprehension holds relatively stable at 49%. It is worth 
noting that self-reported exposure rates decay over time while reception rates hold steady. 
Although Price and Zaller (1993) find the same reception rate for Webster, they only 
examine for short-term recall of the case. Franklin and Kosaki (1995) demonstrate that 
awareness of cases as measured by exposure decreases overtime, but do not look at decay 
in rates of understanding the decisions. 
Self-reported exposure and reception rates for Stanford, Van Orden, and 
McCreary were measured only immediately after the cases were announced. Stanford has 
the lowest reception rate of the four cases at 16%. Measured by comprehension, reception 
of Van Orden and McCreary are again much lower than self-reported exposure as 45% 
correctly explained Van Orden and 35% demonstrated a basic knowledge of McCreary. 
The difference in reception rates for the two Ten Commandments cases is statistically 
significant. 
The results in Table 3.4 demonstrate the importance of using comprehension 
rather than self-reported exposure to measure reception of the Court’s message. Some 
people were willing to claim exposure even though they did not actually understand the 
decision or perhaps never really heard of it. Exposure rates consistently exceed reception 
rates by a wide margin. The results also indicate that reception consistently reduces over 
reporting. Reception insures that individuals who are coded as being aware of the case 
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actually understood it. Without understanding the decisions, it is unlikely that the 
individual received the Court’s message.  
Although measuring reception by comprehension of cases is an improvement over 
other methods used to assess awareness of Court decisions, there are some potential 
problems with this approach. First, the measure is still subject to the possibility of over 
reporting. Individuals may have correctly guessed the outcome of the cases, but I don’t 
think this is a major concern likely. Using an open-ended item should reduce the ability 
of respondents to correctly guess the case outcome. This is designed to reduce over 
reporting, but not completely eliminate it. 
A second potential drawback is that reception rates were measured in the post-
decision waves of panel studies. A possible problem with using panel studies is that 
respondents are primed to think about particular subjects, such as the Court or politics 
more generally, than they would normally. While respondents may be primed about 
politics in general, I do not think priming about the Court is a major concern due to the 
nature of the survey instruments used in the 1989 Pilot and the 2005 Experiment. The 
1989 Pilot taps many political attributes and issue positions; it is a massive survey. It is 
unlikely that the few questions about the Court, abortion, and the death penalty on the 
lengthy surveys received special attention from the respondents and they would pay more 
attention to these issues throughout the study. The 2005 Experiment also included items 
unrelated to the Court to avoid priming individuals. The non-Court items included 
evaluations of other political actors and issues such as steroids in baseball in the pre-
decision survey. In addition, the order of the issue questions was randomized on four 
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different forms. Last, when I conducted the pre-decision surveys for the experiment, 
respondents did not know the specific research question. 
Taken together, the results indicate that that the conventional wisdom can 
understate public awareness of Court activity. Some individuals received the Court’s 
messages in Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and McCreary, albeit with different reception 
rates for each case. Reception as measured by an individual demonstrating that he/she 
understood the decision is a theoretical and practical improvement over previous methods 
for attributing attitude change to the Court. It lowers over reporting and permits one to 
isolate individuals who actually understood the decision. While the descriptive statistics 
in Table 3.4 are informative, it is also necessary to investigate the individual level 
characteristics that systematically influence reception of Court cases. This is the focus of 
the next section. 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS THAT INFLUENCE RECEPTION 
The previous section performed an important task by establishing reception rates 
for Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and McCreary. However, the individual-level factors 
that influence reception are still an open question. In order to determine the 
characteristics that influence reception of Court cases, I estimate a series of regression 
models using the 1989 Pilot and the 2005 Experiment. As noted earlier, reception of 
cases has two components. First, individuals must be exposed to the Court case. Second, 
individuals need to understand the information. Those who demonstrate they understand 
the decision are coded as receiving the case (1). Individuals who do not report exposure, 
explain the case incorrectly, respond don’t know or refused to answer are coded as 
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missing the elite cue provided by the justices (0). Reception is measured separately for 
each case and the models are estimated for each decision. Since the 1989 Pilot tracks 
exposure and comprehension of Webster immediately after the case and several months 
later, I estimate a second reception model for Webster using the later measurement to see 
if any factors influencing awareness change over time. 
Reception of cases should be influenced by several variables. Previous research 
has demonstrated that general political information and education are strong predictors of 
knowledge about specific events like Court cases (e.g. Zaller 1992, Price and Zaller 1993, 
Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996). While some public law scholars include education in 
their analysis, political information is often overlooked. Political information is measured 
by the number of fact-based questions correctly answered by individuals in the 1989 Pilot 
or 2005 Experiment. Education is a scale based on the highest level of educational 
attainment ranging from less than eight years of education (0), no high school diploma 
(1), high school diploma (2), some college (3), junior college or community college 
degree (4), college degree (5), to advanced degree (6). Education does not appear in the 
models for Van Orden and McCreary due to the sample being drawn from college 
students with the same general level of educational attainment. 
Public law scholars consistently contend that media consumption is critical to 
awareness of Court cases (Franklin, Kosaki and Kritzer 1993, Franklin and Kosaki 1995, 
Hoekstra 2003, Scott and Saunders 2006). The logic is as follows. In order for the Court 
to influence public opinion, the media must cover its decisions because people do not 
find out about the cases on their own. Individuals with higher levels of news consumption 
should be exposed to more media reports about the cases, which should increase 
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awareness. News consumption is measured by two variables for Webster and Stanford, 
and three variables for Van Orden and McCreary. For Webster and Stanford, news 
consumption is measured by the number of days a week an individual watches television 
news broadcasts or reads a newspaper. For Van Orden and McCreary, I also include the 
number of days per week an individual consumes Internet news. 
Another way to measure interest in politics is the number of times per week an 
individual talks with others about the subject. Those who have more frequent political 
discussions should be more likely to receive new information like Court cases. The 1989 
Pilot provides this variable for Webster and Stanford, but a similar item was not included 
in the 2005 Experiment. Talking politics is coded for the number of days per week in the 
1988 NES Pilot that an individual engaged in political discussions with others ranging 
from zero to every day. 
Individuals with high levels of interest in the Court or the issues associated with 
the cases should also be more likely to receive the elite cue provided by the justices. 
Those who hold the Court in high regard should be more interested in its activity and 
cases (e.g. Hoekstra 2003).This is measured by a feeling thermometer for whether an 
individual likes or dislikes the Court. Those with extreme initial positions should be more 
likely to follow the cases, as they should have higher interest in the issue than those with 
moderate positions (Price and Zaller 1993, Hoekstra 2003). For Webster, extreme initial 
position is coded 1 if the respondent’s abortion position is that the procedure should 
always be legal or always illegal, 0 otherwise. For the other cases, extreme initial position 
is coded 1 if the respondent either strongly agrees or strongly disagrees with the death 
penalty, the Texas Display, or the Kentucky display, 0 otherwise. Consistent with 
54 
previous public law scholars (Franklin and Kosaki 1995, Hoekstra 2000, Hoekstra 2003), 
I also include gender, race and age as these may indicate higher levels of interest in and 
knowledge about politics. Gender coded as female (1) and male (0), race is coded for 
white (1) and non-white (0), and age by how old the respondent is in years. 
Political characteristics and religion may also increase interest in these cases. 
Partisans and those self-identifying as liberal or conservative should be generally more 
interested and informed about politics. Partisanship is measured by one dummy variable 
for being a Republican and another for Democrat with Independent and other as the 
excluded category.31 Ideology is coded in a similar manner with a dummy variable for 
liberal and one for conservative with moderate the excluded category. Since the cases 
involve issues related religion, I also include measures of religious denomination and 
church attendance. For Webster and Stanford, religion is coded for whether an individual 
is a Catholic (1) or not (0). For Van Orden and McCreary, religion is a dummy variable 
for whether one self-identifies as a Christian (1) or not (0). Church attendance is 
measured by a scale for the number of times per week an individual attends religious 
services ranging from never (0) to weekly (4). 
Due to the dichotomous dependent variables measuring reception of each case, I 
estimate the models using logistic regression (Green 2001). Since the coefficients of 
logistic regression models are not directly interpretable, I also present the changes in the 
predicted probability of receiving the cases for substantively interesting results. 
Results 
The regression results for the reception models are presented in Table 3.5. 
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The logit coefficients in Table 3.5 and substantive results below indicate three 
general points about the factors influencing reception of the cases. First, political 
information is the only variable that increases reception of all four cases. Second, even 
though public law scholars contend media consumption is critical to awareness of cases, 
it performs poorly for three of the four cases. Third, if there is an effect of other variables 
on reception of the cases, the results are not consistent across the models. 
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 present the effect of political information and education on 
case awareness. 
As indicated in Figure 3.1, the effect of political information on reception of each 
case is substantial. Individuals with little general political information are far less likely 
to understand each case than those with more information. For Webster, Van Orden, and 
McCreary, those with high levels of general knowledge are almost guaranteed to receive 
the cases. The effect of political information on receiving Stanford is less dramatic than it 
is for the other three cases.32 As illustrated by Figure 3.2, the effect education on short- 
and long-term reception of Webster is substantial, but slightly less than the effect of 
political information. The small differences between short- and long-term reception of 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 When coding partisanship, leaners are included as identifying with the party they feel closer to. This may 
overestimate the partisans of each party, but leaners should generally act like partisans (Keith et. al. 1992). 
32 The lines representing the effect of political information on receiving each case have different lengths. 
This reflects the data rather than a presentation error. The line for Stanford is shorter than those for the 
other cases because none of the individuals included in the analysis had the highest possible score on the 
political information scale. The battery of questions measuring political information in 2005 Experiment 
had one more question than the 1989 Pilot, which explains why those lines are longer than the ones for 
Webster. 
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Webster do not appear to be very meaningful. Education is not related to receiving 
Stanford. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the effect of media consumption and talking politics 
on receiving cases. 
Contrary to the expectations of public law scholars and in line with Price and 
Zaller’s (1993) findings, news consumption is not a consistent predictor of receiving the 
cases. Consumption of television news increases the probability of understanding 
Stanford, but as illustrated in Figure 3.3, the effects are modest. The frequency of 
political debate is also only related to short-term reception of Webster. As illustrated in 
Figure 3.4, as talking about politics increases from zero days per week to seven, the 
probability of short-term comprehension of Webster increases from .52 to .70. 
Those with extreme pro-choice or pro-life initial positions have a slightly higher 
probability of receiving Webster in both post-decision waves than those holding moderate 
abortion pre-decision attitudes. Immediately after the Webster, the probably of receiving 
the case was .53 among those with moderate initial positions and increases to .66 for 
individuals with extreme pre-decision attitudes. In the long-term, the same pre-decision 
positions lead to an increase from .49 to .63. Again, the differences between the short- 
and long-term results are not very instructive.  Individuals who either strongly agree or 
disagree with the death penalty, however, are slightly less likely to receive the justices’ 
message in Stanford (.12) compared to those with moderate pre-decision attitudes (.20). 
Whether one held an extreme or moderate initial position on the Texas or Kentucky 
displays is not related to receiving Van Orden or McCreary. 
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The remaining results for continue the trend of inconsistency across models. Even 
though the results are uneven, when there is an effect of a particular variable on receiving 
one or more cases, it can be substantial. The probability of receiving Van Orden for 
Whites is .52 and drops to .27 among non-Whites. Conservatives are far more likely to 
receive Van Orden (.84) than non-conservatives (.33) and women have a higher 
probability of understanding McCreary (.42) than men (.18). Figure 3.5 presents the 
negative effect of age on long-term reception of Webster. 
The probability of long-term comprehension Webster drops from .67 among the youngest 
in the sample to .38 among the oldest. Last, as illustrated in Figure 3.6, increased church 
attendance is related to long-term reception of Webster. 
The probability of long-term comprehension of Webster increases from .48 among those 
never attended religious services to .63 for individuals with weekly attendance.  
DISCUSSION 
Measuring case awareness by reception makes the critical theoretical distinction 
between being exposed to new information and understanding it. The results indicate that 
there is also an important empirical difference between exposure to and understanding 
Court cases. Whether measured for Webster, Stanford, Van Orden or McCreary self-
reported exposure would result in classifying a meaningful number of people as receiving 
Court cases who did not understand the justices’ message. Moving to reception avoids 
this problem by insuring individual who claim exposure actually understand the case. In 
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the four cases, this is illustrated by the substantial reduction in over reporting. Properly 
measuring case awareness has practical implications for studying Court-driven attitude 
change. If one relies on self-reported exposure alone, then a substantial number of people 
would be coded as aware of the Court’s message even though they did not understand it 
or actually receive it in the first place. 
The conventional wisdom asserted by Segal and Spaeth (1993) and Segal, Spaeth 
and Benesh (2006) that individuals are generally unaware of Court decisions is probably 
true for most cases. Individuals may not be aware of most Court decisions, but each year 
there are a few that receive sufficient media attention to reach sizable portions of the 
public such as the four cases in this study. The reception rates ranging from the low of 
16% for Stanford to the high of 52% for Webster are consistent with the results of other 
scholars measuring case awareness this way. The lower rate for reception for Stanford 
could be a result of less media coverage of the case, but this chapter does not address how 
much media reporting is required for higher levels of case awareness. The results once 
again demonstrate that some Court decisions garner enough of the public’s attention to 
possibly influence their attitudes on the issues associated with the cases. 
The results indicate that general political information is critical to explaining 
reception of cases. Political information is the only variable that is significant across 
every model. This demonstrates that failing to include general political knowledge when 
explaining individual-level awareness of Court decisions raises some concern. Scholars 
who leave this variable out of their analysis (e.g. Hoekstra 2003, Franklin and Kosaki 
1995) are omitting an important factor in explaining awareness that may overshadow the 
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effect of variables previously thought to be crucial to this process like media 
consumption. 
The substantial effect of political information on reception of cases suggests it 
may be a reasonable proxy for case awareness; however, it still assumes comprehension 
of a decision rather than measuring it. While increased political information is associated 
with a higher probability of receiving the case, it is not a direct measure of case 
awareness. Consequently, it is uncertain whether individuals with certain levels of 
political information understood the cases. Since a more direct measure is available, 
reception based on comprehension of the decision, I will use it instead of relying on a 
proxy. 
Several other individual-level characteristics are related to understanding 
Webster, Stanford, Van Orden and McCreary, but the results are mixed and uneven 
across the cases. Some variables have a large effect for receiving certain cases, but not 
others. For example, higher levels of education increase the probability of receiving 
Webster, but not Stanford. While having a strong initial position increased 
comprehension of Webster, it had the opposite effect on receiving Stanford. This surprise 
demonstrates the uneven nature of the results.  
The differences in the effect of ideology and gender on awareness of Van Orden 
and McCreary are notable because the two cases were decided on the same day and deal 
with similar issues. These results seem to raise more questions than they answer. It is 
possible that conservatives were more likely to remember Van Orden because the Court 
announces a policy that is generally conservative. If individuals remember more details 
about cases they are ideologically predisposed to agree with, liberals should have been 
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more likely to correctly explain McCreary. This was not the case. Also, why would 
women be sometimes more likely to receive one Ten Commandments case than men, but 
not the other? Women may be more likely to be aware of Court decisions (Hoekstra 
2003), but with the cases often reported together, it is surprising that the results are 
different. 
The lack of a systematic influence of news consumption and support for the Court 
are worth noting. The only significant effect of media consumption on reception of cases 
is that of television news on awareness of Stanford and it is modest. This is in line with 
Price and Zaller’s (1993) argument that previous confidence in this variable to explain 
awareness of political events like Court decisions is misplaced. This also creates 
something of a puzzle. In order for the public to receive the Court’s elite cue, the media 
must cover the decisions as few if any individuals will learn about the cases on their own. 
The more coverage a case gets, then the more likely it is that the public will be aware of 
the Court’s actions (Franklin and Kosaki 1995), but media consumption is generally not 
related to reception of cases. This could result from over reporting of media consumption 
creating inflated estimates of how much individuals actually pay attention to the news 
(Price and Zaller 1993, Prior 2005). 
Support for the Court also performed poorly as a predictor of understanding 
Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and McCreary. This may result from the measuring 
support for the Court using a feeling thermometer. A feeling thermometer is not capable 
of measuring two different aspects of support for the course—diffuse and specific 
support. A more nuanced battery of questions assessing support for the Court along these 
two important dimensions may yield better results (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998, 
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Calderia, Spence, and Gibson 2003). However, this method of assessing support for the 
Court is not available in either the 1989 Pilot or the 2005 Experiment. 
At least two factors limit the results of this chapter—case salience and the sample 
for the 2005 Experiment. The cases in this study are all salient for two reasons: media 
attention and personal relevance. When these cases were decided, each appeared on the 
front page of the New York Times. Adding to Epstein and Segal’s (2000) front-page test, 
the media reported on these cases during the year prior to the decisions. Most Court cases 
do not approach receiving this kind of media attention. These cases also deal with issues 
personally relevant to many individuals that increase awareness (Franklin and Kosaki 
1989, Johnson and Martin 1998). Salient cases such as Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, 
and McCreary are not representative of the Court’s docket. Restricting the analysis of 
case awareness to salient ones may artificially inflate reception levels. Even though these 
were salient cases, the highest level of reception in this study was 52%. This suggests that 
even when the public is paying attention to Court decisions, at least one-half of the 
population is not receiving the justices’ message. 
Although the 1989 Pilot study is drawn from a representative sample of adults, the 
2005 experiment was limited to college students. The small and unrepresentative nature 
of the 2005 Experiment sample limits the generalizability of the results for Van Orden 
and McCreary. However, I feel this design is justified due to the limitations of existing 
data to research this question. 
The results of this chapter confirm that measuring awareness of cases by reception 
is an improvement over other methods employed by some public law scholars. While 
outside of political information there were no consistent predictors of receiving the four 
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cases, the results demonstrate that some people received the Court’s message in Webster, 
Stanford, Van Orden and McCreary. The question for the next two chapters is whether 
receiving the elite cue provided by the Court influences attitude change. 
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Chapter 4: The Effect of Receiving Webster and Stanford on Abortion 
and Death Penalty Attitudes 
The previous chapters developed reception of cases as an improved way to 
measure case awareness and attribute attitude change to the Court. These chapters also 
addressed the broader elite debate surrounding the cases and reception rates for the cases 
including the individual-level factors that influence case awareness. In this chapter, I 
begin to combine these elements into examining the public’s response to Supreme Court 
cases by testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2. Specifically, I focus on the effect 
of receiving the Court’s elite cues in Webster and Stanford on abortion and death penalty 
attitudes. 
Given the tendency of political scientists to focus on salient issues and cases 
(Hoekstra 2000), it is not surprising that other scholars have investigated the effect of 
abortion and death penalty cases on public opinion. These scholars employ different 
methods to assess the Court’s influence on public opinion. One approach is to compare 
attitudes before and after Court cases (Marshall 1988, Marshall 1989, Rosenberg 1991, 
Craig and O’Brien 1993). Other scholars use a post-decision measure of self-reported 
exposure to attribute aggregate level attitude change on abortion across two different 
samples (Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998, Brickman and Peterson 
2006) and individual-level in panel studies (Brickman and Peterson 2006). Others employ 
experimental designs (e.g. Hoekstra 1995). Taken together, the results across these 
different research designs are mixed--sometimes the Court can influence abortion and 
death penalty attitudes to varying degrees, but not others. 
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Although the results are mixed, previous research by public law scholars points to 
the importance of personal characteristics like religion (Franklin and Kosaki 1989, 
Johnson and Martin 1998) and political attributes including partisanship (Brickman and 
Peterson 2006) to the Court’s influence on abortion and death penalty attitudes. In this 
chapter, I build on this research tradition in three ways. First, I test the effect of receiving 
Court decisions as measured by understanding the cases, which I developed in Chapters 2 
and 3. Second, I incorporate the findings of political behavior scholars more broadly like 
Zaller (1992) and Gilens (2001) into tests for the effect of the Court on public opinion. 
This allows exploring the effects of receiving the justices’ cues compared to those from 
other political elites on public opinion. Third, in addition to estimating the immediate 
effect of receiving Webster and Stanford on public opinion, the data permit analyzing the 
long-term effects of receiving Webster on abortion attitudes. 
As demonstrated by Brickman and Peterson (2006), partisanship can affect the 
way individuals respond to Court cases. While I have been discussing political elites in 
general terms and specifically for the Court, the effect of party elites on abortion attitudes 
warrants separate attention.  
ABORTION, PARTY ELITES AND THE EFFECT OF WEBSTER PARTISANS 
At the time of Webster, the Democratic and Republican parties had clear and 
increasingly divergent abortion positions. The alignment of party elites on abortion takes 
shape in the 1980s as Republican and Democratic elites polarize becoming more pro-life 
and pro-choice in Congress (Carmines and Woods 2002). Similar changes take place 
among campaign activists (Adams 1997) and national convention delegates (Adams 
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1997, Layman and Carsey 1998, Carsey and Layman 1999). At the end of this change, 
pro-choice elites dominate the Democratic Party and pro-life elites ascend in the 
Republican Party. As the intra-party elite abortion positions become more homogenous, 
the public responds by gravitating toward the new abortion positions of their party 
(Adams 1997). 
Partisan elite cues were also clear on Webster. The specific Supreme Court battle 
over Webster began in 1988 when the Court agreed to take the case. The Reagan 
administration participated with a brief that explicitly called for overturning Roe. 
Republican elite opposition to abortion continues in 1989 when Bush administration 
Solicitor General Charles Fried argued on behalf of the Missouri statute and that Roe 
should be overturned. After the decision, although Webster did not overturn Roe, the 
Bush administration approved of the generally conservative decision permitting state-
level regulation of abortion. According to Bush Administration Attorney General Dick 
Thornburg, Webster was “most welcome in that it recognizes an increased role for state 
legislatures in regulating abortion” (Greenhouse 1989). 
The cues from the party elites to partisans were clear on Webster and abortion 
more generally. For the Republican Party, Roe should be overturned and short of that, 
restricting abortion is desirable. For the Democratic Party, Roe needs to be protected 
from attack and abortion should continue to be a constitutional right. Upon receiving 
these clear elite cues, partisans should gravitate toward the position of their own party 
elites. This leads to the comprehension-party identification hypothesis. 
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Comprehension-Party Identification Hypothesis: Partisans receiving the 
Court’s message will exhibit attitude change consistent with the elite cues 
provided by their party. 
For Republicans, this means becoming more conservative on abortion while 
Democrats should become more liberal. The question becomes whether those partisans 
receiving the Court’s message exhibit systematically different signs of attitude change 
than those unaware of Webster. Webster should reinforce the pro-life elite messages for 
Republicans that receive the case. Democrats, on the other hand, should respond to the 
case through their pro-choice partisan lens.  
In this chapter, I test the comprehension, comprehension-polarization, 
comprehension-affinity for the Court, comprehension-elite alignment, and 
comprehension-party identification hypotheses for Webster and Stanford using the 1989 
Pilot. I begin by briefly discussing the data and describing attitude change on abortion 
and death penalty attitudes. Next, I estimate the effect of receiving Webster and Stanford 
on abortion and death penalty attitudes. The last section discusses the results and 
implications of the findings. 
THE EFFECT OF RECEIVING WEBSTER AND STANFORD ON ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Prior to investigating whether the Court is driving public opinion, it is necessary 
to establish that respondents exhibited any signs of attitude change. Due to the nature of 
the NES items for abortion and the death penalty, it is necessary to discuss the question 
and response options. The 1989 NES Pilot study featured experimental questions to 
investigate the effect of question framing on responses for several subjects including 
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abortion33 and the death penalty,34 but the frames do not systematically influence the 
results below. 
For abortion, the response options, which feature two absolutist positions and two 
positions of varying exceptions, are the same for both question frames. The response 
options for the abortion item are as follows:  
1. By law abortion should never be permitted. 
2. The law should permit abortion only in the case of rape, incest or when 
the woman’s life is in danger. 
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or 
danger to the woman’s life, but only after the clear need for the abortion 
has been established. 
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a 
matter of personal choice. 
                                                 
33 The non-framed question was, “There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. 
Which one of the opinions I am about to read you best agrees with your view on abortion?” The framed 
question was, “There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Some Americans 
oppose abortion: they think of themselves as ‘pro-life’; they believe that abortion is murder. Other 
American believe that a woman should have the right to an abortion: they think of themselves as ‘pro-
choice’; they believe whether or not to have an abortion must be the woman’s choice, not the 
government’s. Which one of the opinions I am about to read you best agrees with your view on abortion?” 
34 The three versions of the death penalty question are: “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty 
for the crime of murder?”, “There is still much controversy about the death penalty in murder 
cases. Some people favor the death penalty because they believe it deters crime. Others oppose the 
death penalty because they believe killing another human being is always immoral, even the 
killing of someone how has committed murder. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for the 
crime of murder?”, and “There is still much controversy about the death penalty in murder cases. 
Some people say that murder is so awful a crime that it deserves to be punished by death. Others 
oppose the death penalty. They say it is unconstitutional because it is ‘cruel and unusual’ 
punishment. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for the crime of murder?” 
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Although the response options are categories that include circumstances different 
in nature, comparing respondent positions before and after Webster sheds light on 
whether there is any attitude change. From these items, it is possible to construct a scale 
of whether an individual generally becomes more liberal or conservative on abortion by 
allowing the procedure in a different number of circumstances after Webster. The 
question has also been demonstrated to be reliable in previous surveys. Individuals 
responding “don’t know” were eliminated from the analysis. 
In addition to the presence of three framed versions of the death penalty item, the 
response options assessing one’s death penalty position changed between the pre- and 
post-Stanford surveys. Both surveys had individuals place themselves on a scale of 
support for the death penalty—strongly favor, not strongly favor, oppose not strongly, 
oppose strongly—but the 1988 survey included an option for “it depends”. Since this 
response option did not appear in the 1989 NES Pilot, individuals selecting “it depends” 
were eliminated from the analysis in addition to those that responded “don’t know”. After 
eliminating these individuals, it is also possible to construct a scale for whether an 
individual increased or decreased his/her level of support for the death penalty after 
Stanford.35
Table 4.1 presents individual level short-term and long-term attitude change on 
abortion following Webster, and short-term attitude change on the death penalty after 
Stanford. 
                                                 
35 Excluding individuals responding don’t know or it depends has consequences. The Court may be 
educating individuals who were uncertain before the case causing them to take positions in the post-
decision survey. Alternatively, receiving the Court’s message may cause an individual to doubt his/her pre-
decision position, perhaps by showing reasonable arguments on both sides, to the point of becoming 
unsure. I chose to do this because my interest is whether the Court is causing individuals to become more 
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The data demonstrate that individuals exhibited attitude change on both abortion 
and the death penalty. Immediately after Webster, 35% of the sample offered a different 
position compared to the pre-decision survey. Individuals tended liberalize on abortion 
with 21% percent of the sample permitting abortion in more circumstances after the 
Webster and 14% moving in a conservative direction. In the long-term, the pattern is 
repeated as 37% of the sample exhibit signs of attitude change two months after Webster. 
Also in the long-term, 23% of respondents became more liberal compared to their pre-
Webster position and 14% became more conservative. While the differences between 
short- and long-term attitude change are not very instructive, the results demonstrate that 
over one-third of individuals exhibited signs of attitude change on abortion following 
Webster. 
Following Stanford, there is also evidence of attitude change. Twenty-eight 
percent of individuals changed their level of support for the death penalty with 15% of 
individuals losing support for capital punishment while 13% move in the opposite 
direction. 
Finding changes in public opinion on abortion and the death penalty is one thing; 
attributing the shift in attitudes to the US Supreme Court is another. Whether this attitude 
change is systematically related to receiving the Court’s messages in Webster and 
Stanford is the focus of the next section. 
                                                                                                                                                 
liberal or conservative on abortion and the death penalty. Moving from uncertainty to certainty (or vice 
versa) may indicate this, but could be a different process. 
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ATTRIBUTING CHANGING ABORTION AND DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES TO THE 
COURT 
If the Court is driving abortion and death penalty attitudes, those receiving the 
justices’ elite cue should respond differently to the decisions than those unaware of the 
cases. As discussed in Chapter 3, short-term reception rates of Webster and Stanford are 
52% and 16%, and the long-term reception held constant for Webster at 49%. According 
to the comprehension hypothesis, individuals who receive the Court’s cue in Webster and 
Stanford should be more likely to move toward its position. While the Court upheld the 
central premise of Roe by not overruling it, the decision permitted increased state 
regulation abortion rights. This represents a restriction rather than expansion of abortion 
rights. In Stanford, the Court approved the imposition of the death penalty on convicted 
murders who were minors when committing the crime. If, as contended by the 
comprehension hypothesis, the Court is educating and persuading the public, then 
individuals who understand the decision should lose support for abortion by allowing the 
procedure in fewer cases. Following Stanford, individuals receiving the justices’ cue 
should become more supportive of the death penalty. 
Table 4.2 provides an initial test of the comprehension hypothesis by presenting 
attitude change on abortion and the death penalty by reception of Webster and Stanford. 
Individuals who report exposure to the cases and demonstrate that he/she understood the 
decisions are coded as receiving the justices’ cue and not receiving it otherwise. 
The data in Table 4.2 do not support the comprehension hypothesis for Webster or 
Stanford. Instead of becoming more conservative on abortion and the death penalty, those 
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who understand the cases move away from the Court’s articulated position. In the short 
term, 19% of those who understand Webster become more liberal on abortion while 10% 
become more conservative. These effects persist in the long-term. This indicates that the 
effect of receiving Webster, while contrary to the comprehension hypothesis, is durable.  
Unlike the results for Webster, more of those receiving Stanford had higher 
attitude instability than individuals who did not receive it. Among individuals receiving 
the Court’s message, attitude change is evenly split between those gaining and losing 
support for the death penalty. Among those not receiving the justices’ cue, individuals 
losing support for the death penalty exceed those gaining support.36
Taken together, the data suggest that support for abortion rights increased, which 
indicates a backlash against the Court’s positions. Due to factors like sample variation, 
the small differences in attitude change by reception of Stanford are probably not 
meaningful. I now turn to regression analysis to determine whether Webster and Stanford 
systematically influenced these changes. 
To investigate whether the US Supreme Court is driving abortion and death 
penalty attitudes, I estimate a series of models separately for the effect of receiving each 
case on attitude change consistent with the hypotheses developed in the previous two 
chapters. The analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, I estimate the short-term 
and long-term effects of receiving Webster on abortion attitudes. In the short-term 
                                                 
36 While it is possible that those mischaracterizing Webster and Stanford are changing their positions in 
accordance with their misperception of the Court’s decision, the coding of reception does not permit this 
conclusion. Contending that  Webster or Stanford were liberal decisions is only one of several possible 
reasons for being coded as not receiving the cases. Those reasons include individuals not exposed to the 
case, those who reported exposure and could not remember what the decision was about, and individuals 
refusing to answer. Consequently, not receiving the Court’s message is different from getting the case 
wrong such as attributing an opposite outcome in Webster to Court. As discussed below, future work 
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Webster models, the dependent variable is whether an individual allows abortions in 
more circumstances (+1), fewer circumstances (-1), or the same number of circumstances 
immediately after Webster in July 1989 compared to his/her initial abortion position in 
1988. The dependent variables are creating by by subtracting the pre-Webster positions 
from post-Webster positions. This creates a possible seven-point scale that I collapsed 
into a three-point scale for becoming more liberal on abortion, more conservative on 
abortion, or no change.37 Individuals who reported “don’t know” or refused to answer 
were eliminated from the analysis. In the long-term abortion models, I compare an 
individual’s initial position in 1988 to the one reported in September or October 1989. 
The dependent variable in the long-term model is constructed the same way as the short-
term abortion models. After estimating these effects, I will compare the results short- and 
long-term models to determine if there is an immediate effect of receiving Webster on 
attitude change and whether it changes over-time. It is also possible that the effect of 
Webster on abortion attitudes is not immediately apparent and only reveals itself several 
months later. 
The second stage of the analysis investigates the effect of receiving Stanford on 
the probability that an individual will alter his/her death penalty position. The dependent 
variable is constructed in a similar manner as the abortion models by subtracting an 
individual’s pre-Stanford death penalty positions from his/her post-Stanford position. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
should have a more sensitive measure of reception to isolate those who think the Court’s decision was the 
opposite of reality to see if they are following a misperceived elite cue. 
37 I collapsed the seven-point scale into a three-point scale because only a handful of cases fall in each of 
the seven categories. The dependent variables do not necessarily indicate a shift from support to opposition. 
This could be the case, but it is more appropriate to discuss these changes as increases or decreases in one's 
level of support for abortion. The construction of the dependent variable also treats all changes in one 
direction the same. For example, those moving from abortion should never be legal to abortion should 
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dependent variable is coded for whether an individual gained support (+1), lost support (-
1), or did not change (0) his/her level of support for the death penalty. Individuals 
responding “it depends” in the pre-Stanford survey or “don’t know” in either wave were 
eliminated from the analysis for the reasons stated above.38
To test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2, I estimate five models for the effect 
of Webster and Stanford on abortion and death penalty models. Due to the partisan nature 
of abortion by the time of Webster, I estimate a sixth model to determine whether 
partisans respond differently to the case in light of the elite cues provided by their own 
party.  
Model 1 tests the comprehension hypothesis, which contends that individuals who 
receive the Court’s message will be more likely to move toward its position than those 
unaware of the case. The key independent variable in this model is reception of the case, 
which is coded the same way as above. Individuals who report exposure to the cases and 
demonstrate that he/she understood the decisions are coded as receiving the justices’ cue 
(1) and not receiving it otherwise (0). I expect that receiving the Court’s message 
regulating abortion rights in Webster will increase the probability of becoming more 
conservative on abortion. Individuals who receive the pro-death penalty message in 
Stanford should become more conservative on the death penalty as illustrated by being 
more supportive of capital punishment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
always be legal are coded as becoming more liberal (+1) as are individuals going from abortion should be 
legal in some circumstances to all circumstances.  
38 As noted above, there are different question frames for abortion and the death penalty, but the question 
version does not influence the results. The inclusion of dummy variables for the standard or framed version 
of the questions does not alter the results. The dummy variables for question type do not approach accepted 
levels of statistical significance for either the abortion or death penalty models. 
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There are several control variables in Model 1 for factors that should influence the 
dynamics of attitude change and the public’s response to Webster and Stanford. One’s 
initial position measured in 1988 is included to capture potential regression to the mean 
effects common in panel studies due to the tendency of respondents to become less 
extreme over time (Hoekstra 2000, Hoekstra 2003). Political information is an additive 
scale from zero to eight constructed from fact-based questions about the role political 
actors and institutions. Those who hold the Court in high regard should be more open to 
its persuasion than those with a negative opinion of it. Support for the Court is measured 
by a feeling thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 and asks subjects to rate how warm or 
cold they are toward the US Supreme Court. Partisanship is measured by one dummy 
variable for being a Republican and another for Democrat with Independent and other as 
the excluded category. Ideology is coded in a similar manner with a dummy variable for 
liberal and one for conservative with moderate the excluded category. Previous scholars 
have demonstrated that group membership should influence attitudes toward abortion 
(Franklin and Kosaki 1989) and the death penalty (Johnson and Martin 1998). Religion, 
church attendance, gender and race should capture some of these group dynamics and 
also provides consistency with previous public law research. Religion is coded 1 if the 
subject self-identifies as a Catholic, 0 otherwise. Church attendance is coded as a scale 
ranging from never (0) to more than weekly (4). Gender and race are also dummy 
variables coded 1 for female, 0 otherwise and 1 for African-American and 0 otherwise. 
Model 2 tests the comprehension-polarization hypothesis that individuals 
receiving the Court’s message will respond to the case by becoming more extreme over 
time on the issues associated with the decision. To estimate whether those receiving the 
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justices’ elite cue are polarizing on abortion or the death penalty, I add a multiplicative 
interaction term between comprehension and one’s initial abortion or death penalty 
position to Model 1. If polarization occurs among those who understand the case, the 
interaction between comprehension and one’s initial position should be significant. This 
indicates that people who understood the cases adopt a more extreme position over time 
compared to those who did not receive the Court’s message. 
Model 3 tests the comprehension-affinity toward the Court hypothesis. 
Perceptions of the Court (Mondak 1990, Mondak 1991, Mondak 1994, Mondak and 
Smithey 1997, Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenberg 2001) should influence its ability to 
persuade the public. This is tested by the addition of an interaction between reception of 
the case and the feeling thermometer for the Court. If those that hold the Court in high 
regard are persuaded by its decisions, then the interactions between receiving Webster 
and Stanford and the Court feeling thermometer should statistically significant. 
According to the comprehension-elite alignment hypothesis, the public’s response 
to receiving Court cases is conditionally to two factors: (1) the broader elite alignment on 
the issue and (2) the relationship between receiving new information and attitude change. 
As noted in Chapter 3, there is a two-sided broader elite debate surrounding Webster and 
Stanford. The effect of receiving the Court’s message and cues provided by other elites 
may have a linear or non-linear relationship with attitude change. 
Model 4 tests the comprehension-elite alignment hypothesis using a linear 
specification for the relationship among receiving the Court’s message, the broader elite 
debate, and attitude change. This is tested by the addition of an interaction between 
political information and receiving each case. As discussed earlier, political information 
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is a reasonable proxy for consumption of the elite cues on an issue (Zaller 1992, Price 
and Zaller 1993). For Webster and Stanford, the effect of receiving the justices’ cue 
should be greatest among those consuming the least amount of the non-Court, two-sided 
elite debate. The effect of receiving the cases should decrease as consumption of the 
broader elite debate increases because the two-sided debate will contain elite cues 
inconsistent with the one from the justices. 
Model 5 tests the comprehension-elite alignment hypotheses by specifying a non-
linear relationship between receiving elite cues and attitude change. This non-linear 
relationship is tested by adding two variables to Model 4: quadratic term for political 
information-squared as well as an interaction between political information-squared and 
receiving the Court cases. For Webster and Stanford, I again expect that the greatest 
effect of receiving cases will be among those consuming the least of the broader elite 
debate. The effect of receiving the cases should begin to decrease among those with 
moderate levels of political awareness and continue to fall as consumption of the two-
sided debate increases. Reception of the cases should have little impact on those with the 
highest level of political information because they should not be open to persuasion. 
Model 6 tests the comprehension-party identification hypothesis for Webster. 
While the independent variables are generally the same as Model 1, there are two 
important changes. First, partisanship is coded differently. Since I am interested in how 
partisans respond to the Court given elite cues provided by their own party, I eliminated 
Independents from Model 1. Democrat is coded 1 if the respondent classifies him/herself 
as a strong, weak or leaning Democrat and 0 if considering oneself a strong, weak, or 
leaning Republican. Second, I include an interaction between partisanship and receiving 
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Webster to test for a conditional relationship between receiving the elite cue provided by 
the Court and those from party elites. 
Since reception is measured separately in both post-Webster surveys, it is possible 
to estimate short- and long-term effects of understanding Webster. The expectations are 
the same for the short- and long-term abortion models—those receiving the Court’s 
message in September should be more likely to move toward its articulated position than 
individuals unaware of the case. To capture the long-term effects of understanding 
Webster, Models 1 through 6 are re-estimated with one important change, short-term 
reception that was measured in July is replaced in all models including the interaction 
terms by long-term reception as measured in September. This allows me to determine 
whether the short- and long-term effects of receiving Webster are different and if any 
Court effect on abortion attitudes is durable. The death penalty models are only estimated 
for short-term effects. 
I estimated the abortion models using multinomial logistic regression due to the 
nature of the response options used to create the dependant variables. Although the 
dependent variable for changing abortion attitudes is generally a scale, the kind of change 
may not be similar in all cases. For example, changing from one category of response 
options like an absolute position of never allowing abortion by law to allowing certain 
exceptions may not be the same kind of change as moving between response options with 
exceptions. The death penalty models are estimated using an ordered probit because of 
the ordinal nature of the dependent variable (Green 2001). Since the coefficients of 
maximum likelihood procedures are not directly interpretable, I calculated changes in the 
predicted probability of attitude change for substantively important results. For the 
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interactive models, I also present the 90% confidence intervals for the estimated 
probability of attitude change to provide context for the certainly of the results. The 
confidence intervals are calculated across the entire range of the lower-order terms in 
order to interpret statistical significance across the values of each variable (Braumoeler 
2004, Kam and Franzese 2005, Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006).39
RESULTS 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the regression results for the short- and long-term 
effect of receiving Webster on abortion attitudes. 
In Table 4.3, the short-term results for Model 1 indicate that receiving the Court’s 
message in Webster is related to attitude change immediately following the case, but do 
not support the comprehension hypothesis. Contrary to expectations, those understanding 
the Court’s message do not become more conservative on abortion. The probability that 
an individual will become more conservative on abortion falls from .16 among those 
missing Webster to .10 among those receiving it. Focusing on Model 1 in Table 4.4, the 
effect of understanding Webster in the short-term model disappears in the long-run 
model. Even though the substantive effect of receiving Webster in the short-term is small, 
the results suggest that the Court is generating a slight, immediate backlash among those 
receiving its message that dissipates over time. 
The results in Table 4.3 and 4.4 do not support the comprehension-polarization or 
the comprehension-affinity for the Court hypotheses for Webster. Whether short or long 
                                                 
39 The predicted probability of attitude change and the confidence intervals of those estimates are 
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term, individuals receiving Webster are not becoming more extreme in their abortion 
positions compared to those unaware of the case. There is no joint effect of receiving 
Webster and one’s level of support for the Court on attitude change. 
As indicated by Table 4.3, the short-term abortion models do not support either 
specification of the comprehension-elite alignment hypothesis. In the long-term models in 
Table 4.4, however, there appears to both linear and non-linear relationships among 
receiving Webster, consuming the broader elite debate, and attitude change for abortion. 
Figure 4.1 presents the results for Model 5, which specifies a linear relationship among 
receiving Webster, consumption of non-Court elite cues and attitude change. This figure 
illustrates the effect of receiving Webster and consumption of non-Court elite cues on the 
probability of a conservative shift in one’s abortion attitudes.  
The results in Figure 4.1 provide some support for the linear version of the 
comprehension-elite alignment hypotheses. Beginning on the left-hand side of Figure 4.1, 
the effect of receiving Webster appears greatest among those consuming little of the two-
sided broader elite debate and it decreases as consumption of non-Court elite cues 
increases, which is consistent with expectations. As consumption of the broader elite 
debate goes from moderate to high, the probability that receiving Webster leads to a 
conservative shift in one’s abortion policy approaches zero. For those unaware of 
Webster, however, the probability of becoming more conservative on abortion is 
relatively stable across consumption of elite cues. This suggests that the Court’s 
persuasive effect is greatest among those receiving its decision and consuming little of 
                                                                                                                                                 
calculated using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000, Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Other 
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the broader two-sided debate; however, for portions of Figure 4.1, there are substantial 
overlaps in the confidence intervals for receiving and missing Webster. 
The next issue is whether the effect of receiving Webster on abortion attitudes is 
statistically different from missing the Court’s cue. Where the Court’s effect appears to 
be greatest, I have little certainty that individuals receiving Webster are different from 
those missing the cue as the confidence intervals of the estimates overlap. At moderate 
consumption of non-Court elite cues, there is almost no statistical difference between 
those receiving and missing Webster. However, individuals who receive Webster are 
increasingly different from those missing the justices’ elite cue as consumption of the 
broader elite debate increases.  Among those consuming moderate to high amounts of 
non-Court elite messages, individuals receiving Webster are less likely to exhibit a 
conservative shift in their abortion positions than those unaware of the case. From this 
perspective, the effect of receiving Webster on abortion attitudes is only statistically 
significant among those consuming the high levels of the elite debate, and the Court is 
virtually unable to move people toward its articulated position as demonstrated by a 
conservative shift in one’s abortion policy. 
Figure 4.2 presents the substantively important results of Model 5, which tests 
whether there is a non-linear relationship among receiving Webster, consumption of the 
broader elite debate and attitude change. This figure presents the substantive impact of 
receiving Webster and consuming the broader elite debate on an individual’s probability 
of liberalizing on abortion. 
                                                                                                                                                 
than the variables of interest, control variables are set at their mean. 
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While it first appears that receiving Webster has the greatest effect on those with 
moderate levels of political awareness, there is no real statistical difference between those 
receiving and missing the case at this level of consuming the non-Court elite discourse. 
At the upper and lower ends of the consumption of non-Court elite messages scale, I have 
little confidence that those receiving Webster are different from those missing the case. 
The results in Model 6 partially support the comprehension-party identification 
hypothesis for Webster. The partisan response to Webster is consistent with expectations 
in the short-term model, but not in the long term-model. Since the comprehension-party 
identification hypothesis contends that partisans will respond to Webster consistently with 
the elite cues of their own party, I am interested in the differences between members of 
the same party that received and missed the Court’s message rather than comparing 
Republicans to Democrats. The substantive effect of receiving Webster and partisanship 
immediately after the case is presented in Figure 5. 
As indicated in Figure 4.3, Democrats liberalize on abortion in the short-term 
model while Republicans seem to become more conservative. Among Democrats 
receiving Webster, the probability of allowing abortion in more circumstances is .16 
compared to .06 among Democrats not receiving the Court’s cue. For Republicans, the 
probability of allowing abortion in more circumstances rises from .11 among those 
understanding Webster to .16 for those missing the Court’s cue. This is consistent with 
the conditional relationship in the comprehension-party identification hypothesis, but the 
overlap in the confidence intervals are important. While I have a good amount of 
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certainty that the effect of Webster on Democrats is statistically significant, I have little 
confidence in the same results for Republicans. 
The long-term effect of receiving Webster on members of the same party is 
different from the short-term effects and do not support the comprehension-party 
identification hypothesis.  Figure 4.4 presents the effect of receiving Webster on 
Republicans and Democrats. 
Republicans who receive the Court’s elite cue exhibit lower probability of 
adopting a more conservative abortion position than those Republicans missing the 
Court’s cue. I have some confidence that receiving Webster decreases the probability of 
adopting a more conservative abortion attitude from approximately .14 to .05. This runs 
counter to the comprehension-party identification hypothesis that Republicans receiving 
Webster should become more conservative on the abortion issue. In the long-term, 
Democrats that receive Webster are not systematically different those Democrats missing 
the Court’s signal. This is illustrated by the complete overlap in confidence intervals for 
Democrats in Figure 4.4. 
The results for the death penalty models are presented in Table 4.5. 
The results in Table 4.5 do not support the comprehension, comprehension-polarization, 
or the comprehension-affinity for the Court hypotheses. The results for the linear 
specification of the comprehension-elite alignment hypothesis are worth noting. There 
appears to be a linear relationship among receiving Stanford, consuming the anti-death 
penalty elite debate, and increased support for the death penalty. Figure 4.5 presents the 
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substantive effect of receiving Stanford and consumption of the broader elite debate on 
the probability of increased support for the death penalty for Model 5. 
Similar to results for Webster, the persuasive effect of receiving Stanford appears greatest 
among those consuming little of the broader anti-Court elite debate. Consistent with 
expectations, the effect of receiving Stanford decreases as consumption of the broader 
elite debate increases. Also, among those missing Stanford, the probability of changing 
support for the death penalty is fairly low and constant across consumption of other elite 
cues. Inspecting the confidence intervals in Figure 4.5, however, reveals that there is little 
certainty to the linear relationship among receiving the case, consuming the broader anti-
death penalty elite debate, and increased support for the death penalty. Across 
consumption of non-Court elite cues, those receiving Stanford are not statistically 
different from those missing the case. 
DISCUSSION 
Under certain conditions, the United States Supreme Court provides an elite cue 
to the public that influences attitude change. Receiving Webster is associated with short-
term attitude change. There is some limited evidence of a linear relationship between 
receiving Webster, consumption of the broader elite debate, and long-term attitude 
change. The analysis also demonstrates that partisans can respond to the case differently 
by following the elite cues of their own party immediately after the case. As time passes, 
however, Republicans receiving Webster rather than Democrats were less likely to 
exhibit a conservative shift in their abortion policies. This finding is consistent with 
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previous work; when there is a Court effect on abortion attitudes, it is modest (e.g. 
Hoekstra 2003). Similarly, while the effect of receiving Stanford is somewhat reduced by 
consumption of the broader two-sided death penalty elite debate, those receiving the case 
are not statistically different from those missing the justices’ cue.  
The results suggest that the public can respond negatively to the Court’s 
articulated position immediately after a case, which fits with the findings of Wlezien and 
Goggin (1993). The results suggest, albeit at a lower than standard level of statistical 
significance, the Court potentially has the greatest persuasive effect on attitudes of 
individuals receiving a case who have low levels of political information. This finding 
makes sense given that these individuals should be open to persuasion if they receive new 
information and are not consuming many other elite cues that possibly undermine the 
Court’s message. 
The long-term results for Republicans were surprising as they run counter to the 
position of elites in their party. It is possible that some Republicans are rejecting the 
position of the Court and their own party as an attack on the status quo. It is also possible 
that this results from the coding of partisanship. In the models, partisanship is coded from 
the pre-election wave of the 1988 NES. It is possible that changes in partisanship, as well 
as other control variables, occurred between the pre-election NES and the September-
October wave of the 1989 Pilot.40
The lack of results for the effect of receiving Stanford on death penalty attitudes 
compared to the effect of Webster on abortion attitudes could be related to case salience. 
The Court should have its greatest opportunity to shape public opinion when issuing 
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salient cases that are personally relevant to average Americans (Franklin and Kosaki 
1989, Johnson and Martin 1998, Hoekstra 2003). On some measures of case salience 
such as Epstein and Segal’s (2000) front page of the New York Times test, Webster and 
Stanford are both salient. However, not all cases passing this test are equal in the eyes of 
the public. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, reception rates for Webster were 52% 
immediately after the case and 49% several months later, which far exceeded Stanford’s 
16% reception rate. This indicates that Webster was far more salient to individuals in the 
sample than Stanford was. The difference in reception rates makes sense given the greater 
media coverage of Webster abortion compared to Stanford and the death penalty 
discussed in the previous chapter. It is possible that there is a critical level of reception of 
cases for the Court to influence public opinion, and that Webster exceeded this level 
while Stanford did not. One implication of this is that the Court has a better opportunity 
to shape public opinion in widely reported cases that the public understands. 
The analysis in this chapter may be influenced by several other factors including 
the measurement of receiving Court cases, the wording of the NES items, and limiting the 
investigation to two cases more widely reported than average ones. 
Comprehension of Court cases as a measure of receiving the justices’ cue should 
be refined in the future because it only captures one aspect of the elite message, the 
majority opinion. One improvement is to measure whether an individual understands 
other aspects of the decision including dissenting opinions if they exist. It is possible that 
individuals understood the dissenting justices in Webster or Stanford and responded to 
the liberal tone of their opinions. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, future work should also 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 A third possibility is panel attrition. There may be important differences between individuals including 
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investigate whether those getting a Court case wrong are following a mistaken cue. For 
example, one could become more liberal on abortion because he/she wrongly attributes a 
strong pro-choice meaning to Webster. The current measure of reception does not capture 
these kinds of effects. 
The broad NES questions and responses have several merits including tapping 
overall abortion and death penalty attitudes, and consistency across time, but they also 
prevent more nuanced analysis. On abortion, the response options could better distinguish 
health and discretionary abortions because the public’s response to abortion cases can 
vary on those two dimensions (e.g. Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Wlezien and Goggin 1993, 
Johnson and Martin 1998). Receiving the Court’s message could cause an individual to 
alter the kinds of abortions they permit while not being captured by the broad NES 
categories. For example, a change within the kinds of discretionary abortions an 
individual allows may not be captured by the broad NES question and response options. 
On the death penalty, receiving Stanford could be associated with less support for 
imposing the death penalty on minors, but this may not necessarily translate into one’s 
overall support for the death penalty. 
Focusing on Webster and Stanford cause generalizability problems and might 
overestimate the Court’s ability to influence public opinion. Most Supreme Court cases 
are not like Webster as it garnered more media coverage than the average case. Even 
though Webster was more salient to individuals in the 1989 Pilot Study, Stanford still 
receives more press coverage than the average case (Slotnick and Segal 1989). On the 
other hand, this chapter may be a conservative test of the Court’s ability to shape public 
                                                                                                                                                 
partisans who participated in the entire panel compared to dropping out after the first post-Webster survey. 
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opinion. Individuals might be less open to persuasion on personally salient issues that 
they intensely care about (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo 1986, Fiske and Taylor 1991, Johnson 
and Martin 1998). Together, this puts the focus on the kinds of cases that comprise a 
small percentage of the Court activities (Hoekstra 2003). However, focusing on salient 
cases is worthwhile because if the Court cannot influence public opinion in high-profile 
cases, then it should be even less likely to do so for those constituting most of its 
docket.41 Also, the uneven results of previous research on Court-driven attitude change 
indicate that additional work in this area is important, even for salient cases. Limiting 
scholarship to the average case could be overlooking a Court effect where reception of 
the justices’ elite cue should be the greatest. 
This chapter began with the proposition that the United States Supreme Court can 
influence attitude change among individuals who receive its decisions. Given the 
potential limitations of the analysis, reception of Webster still has a measurable effect on 
abortion attitudes and that the Court-effect is conditionally related to one’s partisanship. 
The effects of Webster including the differential partisan response also change over time. 
The results for elite alignment hypothesis are less encouraging as the effect receiving the 
justices’ elite cue and the broader elite alignment do not approach traditionally accepted 
levels of statistical significance. Thus far, it does not appear that receiving Court cases 
causes polarization or that the effect of understanding decisions on attitude change varies 
by one’s affinity for the Court. The next chapter continues to test the effect of receiving 
the Court cases on public opinion by examining the influence of two recent cases, Van 
Orden and McCreary, on attitudes toward publicly displaying the Ten Commandments.
                                                 
41 To attempt to deal with generalizability problems, the next chapter analyzes the effect of receiving two 
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CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF RECEIVING VAN ORDEN AND 
MCCREARY ON ATTITUDES TOWARD PUBLICLY DISPLAYING THE TEN 
COMMANDMENTS
In this chapter, I continue to test whether the Court is driving public opinion. 
Specifically, I examine the effect of receiving Van Orden and McCreary on attitudes 
toward publicly displaying the Ten Commandments. While the previous chapter used 
existing survey data to investigate the effect of receiving Court decisions on attitude 
change, this chapter takes advantage of a quasi-experiment conducted in Austin, Texas. I 
begin this chapter by discussing the pre- and post-decision surveys used in the 2005 
Experiment, which is followed by whether attitudes toward the Texas and Kentucky Ten 
Commandments displays changed over time. Next, I estimate the effect of receiving Van 
Orden and McCreary on attitudes toward the displays. The chapter closes with a 
discussion of the results. 
THE 2005 EXPERIMENT: PRE- AND POST-DECISION SURVEYS 
The pre-decision surveys were conducted in various political science classes at 
the University of Texas-Austin and a large urban community college between June 17 
and June 23, 2005. The Court announced Van Orden and McCreary on Monday, June 27, 
2005. Sixty-nine percent of the post-decision surveys were conducted on June 28, 2005 
and 31% on June 30, 2005.42  
                                                                                                                                                 
other Court cases on public opinion using a quasi-experimental design.  
42Ideally, I would like to measure respondent attitudes prior to the Court agreeing to take a case, but 
practical concerns made this impossible. 
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After a series of items to measure general political information, demographic 
characteristics, political attributes, and evaluations of political institutions and actors, I 
assessed respondent positions on the Ten Commandments displays at issue in each case. I 
used two items to tap individuals’ positions in the pre-and post-decision surveys: 
Do you agree or disagree with the Ten Commandments being displayed on 
the grounds of the Texas state capitol? 
Do you agree or disagree with the Ten Commandments being posted in a 
courtroom? 
The response options for each question were strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
strongly disagree, and don’t know. To avoid priming effects, the subjects did not know 
the exact purpose of the survey and answered questions about several issues including 
same sex marriage, affirmative action, and the use of steroids in athletics. These issue 
items were randomized on four different forms. 
The post-decision survey contained three important items: the same issue items 
for publicly displaying the Ten Commandments, self-reported exposure for each case, 
and comprehension of each case. The two items assessing respondent positions on the 
Ten Commandments were asked first. These were followed by the exposure and 
reception (comprehension) items for Van Orden. The final two questions tapped self-
reported exposure to and reception of McCreary. After the post-decision survey, 
respondents completed a debriefing form explaining the purpose of the study. At this 
time, respondents were asked whether they consent to the data being used in this study. 
After obtaining consent, I matched respondents’ pre- and post-decision surveys creating a 
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panel study with 132 individuals. The pre-and post-decision surveys, participant 
debriefing form, and IRB approval are located in the Appendix. 
ATTITUDES BEFORE AND AFTER VAN ORDEN AND MCCREARY 
Pre-decision support for public displays of the Ten Commandments is lower in 
the sample than two 2005 CNN/USA Today polls.43  Compared to the nearly three out of 
four people supporting similar displays in national samples, 47% of the sample supported 
the Texas display and 40% agreed with the one from Kentucky before the decisions. 
While support for the displays is lower in the experimental sample than in national 
surveys, it is still possible to determine whether there is attitude change before and after 
the cases.  
Attitude change is measured using the same method as Chapter 4: respondent pre-
decision levels of support are subtracted from their post-decision levels. This creates a 
possible seven-point scale that is collapsed into three categories for whether an individual 
generally becomes more supportive of each display (+1), less supportive (-1), or has not 
changed his/her support (0). Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for attitude change 
on both displays. The results in Table 5.1 include only individuals who completed the 
panel study and omits anyone responding “don’t know” in the pre-decision or post-
decision waves.44
                                                 
43 The poll questions were as follows. In February 2005, “As you may know, the US Supreme Court will 
decide a case regarding whether a monument to the Ten Commandments can be displayed on the grounds 
of the Texas state capital building. Do you think the US Supreme Court should—or should not—allow the 
state government to display the monument?” In June 2005, “As you may know, the US Supreme Court will 
decide a case regarding whether a monument to the Ten Commandments can be displayed on the grounds 
of state government buildings in Texas and Kentucky. Do you think the US Supreme Court should—or 
should not—allow the state government to display that monument?” 
44 Eliminating those responding “don’t know” removes approximately 10% of respondents from the panel.  
The proportion of individuals responding “don’t know” in either wave of the experiment does not vary 
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These results provide preliminary evidence that a fair number of respondents 
exhibited attitude change in both directions on the Ten Commandments displays. Overall, 
the subjects exhibited greater levels of support for the Texas display than the Kentucky 
display. Thirty-two percent and 37% of the sample offered different positions following 
Van Orden and McCreary, respectively. For both cases, some people shift toward the 
Court’s articulated positions, but others move in the opposite direction. Following Van 
Orden, 17% of the sample became more supportive of the constitutional Texas display 
while 15% lost support. After McCreary, 16% gain support for the unconstitutional 
Kentucky display compared to 21% moving in the opposite direction. This provides some 
evidence of attitude change for both cases. Determining whether the Court is driving this 
change is the subject of the rest of this chapter.  
To attribute attitude change to the Court, I am again using reception of the cases 
as measured by an individual being able to correctly explain the decision in his/her own 
words. As discussed in Chapter 3, a substantial portion of the sample reported exposure 
to the cases and some individuals accurately described the case outcomes. Please note 
that subjects were not provided with specific information about the Court decisions in 
either the pre- or the post-decision surveys. Seventy-six percent of the sample reported 
exposure to Van Orden and 53% for McCreary. Measured by understanding the 
decisions, reception rates for the decisions are lower than self-reported exposure as 45% 
correctly explained Van Orden and 35% demonstrated a basic knowledge of McCreary. 
The difference in reception rates for Van Orden and McCreary is statistically significant. 
                                                                                                                                                 
greatly. The percentages of individuals responding “don’t know” in either wave were: pre-Van Orden 
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These results underscore the importance measuring reception by comprehension instead 
of self-reported exposure. A sizable portion of the sample were willing to claim exposure 
even though they did not understand the decision or perhaps never actually heard of it. 
Without understanding the decisions, it is unlikely that the individual received the 
Court’s message. 
An early step in determining whether the Court is driving public opinion is to 
examine attitude change by reception of the cases. This is presented in Table 5.2. 
According to the comprehension hypothesis, people who understand the cases 
should shift toward the Court’s articulated position. The data partially support this. If one 
received Van Orden, then he/she is more likely to change positions over time compared 
to an individual that missed the elite cue provided by the justices. In addition, 20% of 
those who received Van Orden had more support for the Texas display after the decision 
compared to the 16% with less support. Among those not receiving Van Orden, 
individuals exhibiting more support for the Texas display outnumber those losing 
support, but to a lesser degree than those receiving the case. This suggests that 
understanding Van Orden leads to higher support for the Texas display, but the 
differences are not striking. 
The data in Table 5.2 support the comprehension hypothesis for McCreary. 
Twenty-four percent of individuals receiving the justices’ message in McCreary that the 
Kentucky display is unconstitutional lost support for it over time while only eight percent 
increased support for it. Among those missing McCreary, there is a relatively even split 
                                                                                                                                                 
(11%), post-Van Orden (13%), pre-McCreary (8%) and post-McCreary (9%). 
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between gaining and losing support for courthouse display. Individuals receiving 
McCreary had slightly more stable attitudes than those who missed the case. 
Taken together, the preliminary analysis demonstrates that receiving Van Orden 
and McCreary may influence attitude change. I now turn to regression analysis to 
determine whether Van Orden or McCreary systematically influenced these changes. 
Similar to the previous chapter, I estimate a series of models test four of the 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2—the comprehension, comprehension-polarization, 
comprehension-affinity for the Court, and comprehension elite-alignment hypotheses.  
The dependent variables are coded separately for each case and in the same way as 
above. Each dependent variables measures whether a respondent became more supportive 
of the display at issue in the case (+1), less supportive (-1), or did not change (0).  I 
created these variables by subtracting the pre-decision positions from post-decision 
positions on each issue. This creates a possible seven-point scale that I collapsed into a 
three-point scale for more, less or same level of support for the Ten Commandments 
display. Individuals responding “don’t know” in either wave are excluded from the 
analysis. The models developed below are estimated separately for the two cases to test 
the effect of receiving the justices’ elite cue on support for each Ten Commandments 
display.45
The independent variables are coded consistently with those in Chapter 4 and 
included for the same reasons. Although some variables change from model to model, 
reception of the cases and several control variables are present in each. Reception is a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 if the person could correctly describe the case and 
                                                 
45 This approach is similar to the one used in the previous chapter and is subject to the same limitations. 
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demonstrate reception of the Court’s message, 0 otherwise. Political information is an 
additive scale from zero to nine constructed from a series of open-ended questions about 
political actors and institutions. The feeling thermometer runs from 0 to 100 and asks 
subjects to rate how warm or cold they are toward the US Supreme Court. Partisanship is 
measured by one dummy variable for Republican and one for Democrat with Independent 
and other the excluded category for both. Ideology is coded in a similar way with a 
dummy variable for liberal and one for conservative with moderate the excluded 
category. Religion is coded 1 if the subject self-identifies with a Christian religion, 0 
otherwise. Church attendance is coded as a scale ranging from never (0), several times a 
year (1),  monthly (2), weekly (3), to more than weekly (4). One’s initial position is 
included to capture the tendency for respondents to become less extreme over time in 
panel studies (Hoekstra 2003 & 2000). 
Model 1 tests the comprehension hypothesis. According to the comprehension 
hypothesis, those who receive the cases will be more likely to move toward the Court’s 
position. This tests whether the Court is leading changes in public opinion among those 
receiving its elite cue. The expectations for reception are different for Van Orden and 
McCreary because of the case outcomes. If the Court drives attitude change, reception of 
Van Orden should be positive and significant, as people should become more accepting 
of the approved Texas display. Receiving McCreary, on the other hand, should be 
negative and significant because the Court decided the Kentucky display was 
unconstitutional.  
Model 2 tests the comprehension-polarization hypothesis by adding a 
multiplicative interaction term between reception and one’s initial position to Model 1. If 
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polarization occurs among those who understand the case, the interaction between 
reception and one’s initial position should be positive and significant. This indicates that 
people who understood the cases adopt a more extreme position following the cases 
compared to those who did not receive the Court’s message. 
Model 3 tests the comprehension-affinity toward the Court hypothesis. If those 
who hold the Court in high regard are persuaded by its decisions, then the interaction 
between receiving Van Orden and the Court feeling thermometer should be positive and 
significant while it should be negative and significant for McCreary. 
Models 4 tests the linear specification of the comprehension-elite alignment 
hypothesis by adding an interaction between receiving the case and consumption of elite 
cues to Model 1. Consumption of the broader elite debate is once again measured by a 
proxy, general political information. If the message provided by the Court in Van Orden 
amplifies the slightly more pro-display orientation of other elites in a linear fashion, the 
effect of receiving the case should increase with additional consumption of the broader 
elite debate. If the elite message provided by the Court in McCreary is offsetting the 
broader debate leaning toward favoring the display, then the effect of receiving 
McCreary should decrease as consumption of non-Court elite messages increases. 
Model 5 tests the non-linear specification of the comprehension-elite alignment 
hypothesis by adding two variables to Model 4: political information-squared and an 
interaction between political information-squared and receiving the cases. If there is a 
non-linear relationship among receiving the Court’s pro-display decision in Van Orden, 
the pro-display broader elite debate, and attitude change, I expect that the effect of 
receiving the case will increase as consumption of elite cues reaches moderate levels and 
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begin to decrease among those consuming the most non-Court elite cues. For McCreary, 
I expect that the effect of receiving the anti-display decision will be the greatest among 
those with the least information and decrease as consumption of the pro-display elite 
debate at odds with the Court decision increases. The effect of receiving McCreary 
should diminish rapidly as one’s consumption of elite cues moves from moderate to high 
as an increasing amount of countervailing messages become available to individuals 
unlikely to be persuaded by new information. 
There may be important consequences of Van Orden originating in Austin, Texas 
and conducting the quasi-experiment in the same city. Previous research demonstrates 
that cases relevant to local populations can have a larger effect on attitude change than 
geographically remote cases (Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Hoekstra 2003). It is possible that 
receiving the Court’s elite cue in a local case like Van Orden could be influencing how an 
individual views a similar issue from a geographically distant area like Kentucky. 
Individuals could be following the elite cue provided by the justices in the more salient, 
local case when considering the Kentucky display. This leads to a hypothesis for this 
chapter that is unique to the 2005 Experiment, the comprehension-geographic proximity 
hypothesis. 
The Comprehension-Geographic Proximity Hypothesis: Individuals 
receiving the pro-display Court message in Van Orden will become more 
supportive of the Kentucky display because Van Orden is the locally 
relevant, more salient case. 
The comprehension-geographic location hypothesis is tested in Models 6. The 
dependent variable for Model 6 is the same as above, change in support for the Kentucky 
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display over time. In Model 6, the independent variables are the same as Model 1 plus an 
additional variable--reception of Van Orden. If receiving the Court’s message from the 
local case is influencing attitudes toward the geographically remote Kentucky display, 
then the coefficient on receiving Van Orden should be positive and significant. This 
indicates that receiving the pro-display message sent by the majority of the Court in Van 
Orden is related to increased support for the Kentucky display.  
It is also possible that the effect of receiving Van Orden goes beyond influencing 
attitudes toward the Kentucky display. Receiving the local case could overpower the 
effect of receiving the geographically distant case. This suggests that there is a 
conditional relationship between the two cases. For individuals receiving both cases, the 
effect of the local case Van Orden should be greater than that of the geographically 
distant McCreary. This is tested in Model 7 by including variable for receiving both 
cases, which is an interaction between receiving Van Orden and McCreary.  
Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, I estimate the models using a 
maximum likelihood procedure, ordered probit (Green 2001). I also present the predicted 
probability of attitude change with 90% confidence intervals for substantively important 
results.46
RESULTS 
The regression results for Models 1 through 5 testing the comprehension, 
comprehension-polarization, comprehension-affinity for the Court, and comprehension-
elite alignment hypotheses are presented in Table 5.3. Positive coefficients indicate more 
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support for the display at issue in the case after the decision and negative coefficient 
indicate less support.  
The results for Model 1 partially support the comprehension hypothesis. While 
reception of Van Orden is not related attitude change on the Texas display in Model 1, 
the effect of receiving McCreary is significant and in the expected direction. Those 
receiving McCreary are more than twice as likely to exhibit decreased support for the 
unconstitutional Kentucky display. The probability of this type of change is .29 among 
those receiving the justices’ elite cue and drops to .12 for those who miss the Court case. 
Model 2 does not support the comprehension-polarization hypothesis, but the 
results are worth noting. If the Court decisions caused polarization, the interaction 
between receiving the cases and one’s initial position would have been positive and 
significant. Contrary to expectations, this interaction is negative and significant for Van 
Orden. The substantive effect of receiving Van Orden and one’s initial position on 
attitude change are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates that individuals who initially strongly agreed with the Texas 
display and received Van Orden lose support for the approved display. Those who 
strongly agreed with the Texas display in the pre-decision survey and received Van 
Orden have a .73 probability of losing support for the display after the case. The 
probability of a similar change among those missing the case is only .20. As the 
confidence intervals do not overlap, this result is statistically significant. Among those 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 The probabilities are calculated using Clarify. Except for the variables of interest, the independent 
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with more moderate initial positions, individuals who receive the case are not different 
from those missing the case. Since the moderation effect is among those with the extreme 
position of strongly agreeing with the Texas display who received Van Orden, the 
tendency for those become less extreme over time is more likely from receiving the 
Court’s message than a general regression effect common to panel studies. 
Looking at Figure 5.2, if one initially strongly disagreed with the Texas display, 
the probability of increased support is .61 among those receiving the case and .39 for 
those missing it. However, this result does not appear to be statistically significant as 
there is a fair amount of overlap in the confidence intervals for these estimates. In 
addition, those receiving the case with moderate initial positions do not appear to have a 
systematically different response than individuals missing Van Orden.  
The results for Model 3 do not support the comprehension-affinity for the Court 
hypothesis. Those who hold the Court in high regard and received the cases do not move 
toward the Court’s positions in either case, as the interaction terms do not approach 
accepted levels of statistical significance. 
The results for Model 4 seem to partially support the comprehension-elite 
alignment hypothesis as there appears to be a linear relationship among receiving Van 
Orden, consumption of elite cues, and attitude change, but not one for McCreary. The 
effect of understanding Van Orden and consumption of the broader elite debate on 
attitude change are presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
                                                                                                                                                 
variables are set at their means (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000, Tomz, Wittinberg, and King 2003). 
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Moving from left to right in Figure 5.3, individuals who receive Van Orden are 
less likely to lose support for the Texas display as political information increases. The 
results also suggest that those who miss Van Orden do not exhibit dramatic signs of 
attitude change. While these general patterns are interesting, it does not appear as if 
individuals who receive the case are statistically different from those missing it. At each 
level of political information, there is an overlap in the confidence intervals. 
While the results do not achieve traditionally accepted levels of significance, I am 
more confident in the results for those consuming little information where the overlap in 
confidence intervals is markedly less than other points in the figure (Kam and Frazese 
2007). Among those consuming the least non-Court elite cues, I have some confidence 
that individuals receiving Van Orden are more likely to lose support for the Texas display 
than individuals missing the case—albeit not at the 90% level. Once consumption of non-
Court elite cues reaches moderate levels and above, the somewhat certain differences 
between those receiving and missing the case disappear. 
Figure 5.4 presents the effect of receiving Van Orden on gaining support for the 
Texas display. In general, those who receive Van Orden appear to move toward the 
Court’s articulated position as consumption of the broader elite debate increases. Similar 
to the previous figure, the effect of receiving the case is never statistically distinct from 
that of missing it. However, the results approach statistical significance among those with 
little political information. Again, individuals receiving the case who consume little of 
the broader elite debate have a lower probability of moving to the Court’s position than 
those missing Van Orden. Among those with moderate to high consumption of the 
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broader elite debate, the effect of receiving Van Orden is clearly not statistically 
distinguishable from that of missing the case. 
The results in Model 5 do not support the non-linear specification of the 
comprehension-elite alignment hypothesis for either Van Orden or McCreary. 
The regression results for the comprehension-geographic proximity hypothesis are 
presented in Table 5.4. 
The results in Model 6 do not support the comprehension-geographic proximity 
hypothesis as receiving Van Orden does not influence attitudes on the Kentucky display. 
These results suggest that receiving McCreary is still associated with decreased support 
for the Kentucky display even when controlling for the geographically proximate case 
with a conflicting outcome. While the substantive effect of receiving McCreary is smaller 
after including reception of Van Orden in the model, those who understand the case have 
a higher probability of losing support for the unconstitutional display (.16) than those 
missing the justices’ cue (.07).  
The results for Model 7 suggest a conditional relationship between receiving both 
cases and support for the Kentucky courthouse display. The substantive effect of 
receiving both cases is presented in Figure 5.5. 
The results indicate that individuals receiving both cases lost support for the Kentucky 
display, which is contrary to my expectation that receiving the local case would 
overpower the effect of the geographically distant case. However, the large confidence 
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interval on the estimated probability of losing support among individuals receiving both 
cases means that I cannot be very certain of this result. 
DISCUSSION 
Like the previous chapter, the Supreme Court sometimes provides an elite cue to 
the public that can lead to attitude change among those receiving the message. Also like 
the previous chapter, the results are modest and inconsistent across the models. 
The results for the comprehension hypothesis are straightforward. Receiving Van 
Orden did not systematically influence attitudes on the Texas display. Individuals in the 
2005 Experiment, however, had a “positive response” to McCreary. After the Court ruled 
that the Kentucky display was unconstitutional, individuals receiving this message lost 
support for the rebuked display. Reception of McCreary doubles the probability of 
moving in the same direction as the Court’s decision, which demonstrates the Court can 
legitimate certain policy positions under some conditions. This raises a question. Why did 
individuals positively respond to McCreary, but not Van Orden? 
The different results for the two cases might be influenced by the regional nature 
of the sample. Those from Austin could be more interested in Van Orden because it 
originated in the city where most of the sample resides compared to the more distant 
Kentucky case. The case with geographic proximity could lead to more interest and well-
elaborated ideas, and consequently a better ability to generate counter-arguments. This 
should lead to higher resistance to new information (Hoekstra 2003). Since individuals 
may be less interested in the Kentucky case, they could be more open to persuasion. The 
higher reception rate for Van Orden supports that it was more interesting to the sample 
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and individuals were more likely to learn about the closer case than the distant one. 
However, making claims about interest in the issue is difficult because the data do not 
include clear measures of interest in the cases such as how important the issues are to the 
respondents. 
Receiving Van Orden and McCreary did not cause polarization on publicly 
displaying the Ten Commandments. The effect of understanding Van Orden on support 
for the Court-approved Texas display is conditionally related to one’s initial position, but 
not as I expected. Receiving Van Orden is associated with attitude moderation over time 
on the Texas display for those initially strongly agreeing with the monument. This is the 
clearest findings for any of the conditional models. It is also surprising. Individuals who 
initially strongly agreed with the Texas display lost support for it after the Court 
approved the display. It is possible that some individuals who initially held an extreme 
position were being educated by new information causing them to question their original 
belief. For example, individuals receiving the pro-display message in Van Orden may 
have also received and been influenced by the anti-display messages from dissenting 
justices or other sources. As noted elsewhere in this project, it is not possible to test this 
directly using the 2005 Experiment because the data do not explicitly track attention to 
dissenting opinions. 
The effect of receiving the justices’ elite cue does not vary by one’s affinity for 
the Court. As noted in Chapter 4, this may be a product of the survey instrument. Like the 
1989 Pilot, a feeling thermometer measures affinity for the Court. Consequently, this 
measure suffers from the same shortcomings as the one used in Chapter 4.  
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The results for the comprehension-elite alignment hypotheses and Van Orden are 
less than stellar as they only approach statistical significance. However, I have some 
certainty in the results for those with low amounts of political information. At lower 
levels of general knowledge, there is far less overlap in the estimated confidence intervals 
(Kam and Franzese 2007). Still, the results are surprising. That individuals receiving the 
Court’s message and little of the broader elite debate have a higher probability of attitude 
change in part of the analysis was expected. These individuals should be open to 
persuasion if they receive new information. I expected that these individuals would move 
toward the Court’s position because they are in effect only receiving the new information 
provided by the justices and are missing the broader elite debate. This was not the case; 
receiving Van Orden did not legitimate the Court’s articulated position among those 
consuming little of the broader elite debate. If anything, the results suggest a possible 
backlash against the Court’s position, but such a “negative” reaction is not clearly 
demonstrated by the data. 
From this perspective, it is also surprising the receiving McCreary did not 
influence support for the Kentucky display among those consuming little of the broader 
elite debate. Those with little political information who actually receive the Court’s 
message should also receive the fewest cues from other elites. This should increase the 
effect of receiving McCreary among those with less political information because they 
are exposed to fewer countervailing messages from the slightly leaning pro-display elite 
debate. 
It is possible that the different responses to the two cases—the legitimating effect 
of receiving McCreary and the suggested backlash against Van Orden among those with 
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little political information—are caused by individuals responding to different aspects of 
each decision. Individuals may be responding to the portions of the liberally toned 
opinions written by the dissenting justices in Van Orden and the majority in McCreary. 
However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the measurement of receiving the justices’ 
cues is only sensitive to understanding the majority position. Consequently, it is not 
possible to estimate whether individuals are responding to the dissenting justices. This 
underscores the importance of developing a more nuanced measure of receiving the 
Court’s message in the future, which is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
More generally, a few factors limit the results of this analysis including the nature 
of the sample and the question wording of the survey instrument. The analysis relies on a 
small sample drawn from college students in the Austin area. While the summary 
statistics in the appendix indicate that the sample has some diversity, it is not 
representative of the national adult population. Although the courses that provided the 
sample did not cover the cases, it is possible that respondents discussed the cases outside 
of class because of local interest in Van Orden. However, I do not think this is a major 
problem because I am interested in the effect of receiving the Court’s message regardless 
of the source of that knowledge. Using more representative samples ranging from a 
sample of adults drawn from the general population of a city to the ideal of a 
representative sample of the national adult population, such as the one used in the 
previous chapter, would increase the generalizability of the results in this chapter. 
The question wording of the survey instrument poses some potential problems for 
the analysis. Specifically, the items used to create the dependent variables tapping 
respondent positions on publicly displaying the Ten Commandments may be overly 
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detailed and possibly cause priming effects. The questions included references not only to 
the specific location of the Ten Commandment displays on government property and the 
questions related to Van Orden also include references to the Texas State Capitol. This 
may prime respondents to think about the location of the displays when evaluating each 
one at the expense of isolating the effect of receiving the justices’ cues. In the future, 
general questions for an individual’s issue positions could avoid these problems. Because 
these were the only forms of the questions used in the 2005 Experiment, I am unsure of 
the actual effect of question wording, but feel it is worth noting the potential problems. 
Overall, the results of this chapter are mixed. The effect of McCreary on attitudes 
toward the Kentucky display appears to be systematic, but small. The effect of Van 
Orden on attitudes about the Texas display is less certain. Combined with the analysis in 
the previous chapters, there are distinct theoretical and some empirical benefits to 
measuring the effect of receiving the Court’s message through comprehension of the 
decisions.  
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I conclude my discussion of whether the 
Court is influencing public opinion by exploring some of the broader aspects of the 
research project and prospects for future research. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This project began with several assertions. First, the U.S. Supreme Court provides 
an elite cue to the public that can induce attitude change. Second, in order to understand 
this process better, it is necessary to properly assess case awareness by measuring 
reception of decisions. Third, Supreme Court cases do not reach the public in isolation, 
but rather are accompanied by a broader elite debate that influences attitude change. 
Taken together, the results suggest that reception of cases is a conceptual and empirical 
improvement for attributing attitude change to the Court, but the effect of receiving Court 
decisions on public opinion is mixed and uneven across the cases. In addition, when there 
is a Court effect, it is usually modest. There is a complex relationship between the Court 
and public opinion, which includes how the public responds to Court decisions. The 
results in the preceding chapters shed some light on this complex relationship, but also 
raise several questions and avenues of future research. 
In order for the Court to influence public opinion, individuals must be aware of its 
cases. Reception of cases has theoretical and empirical advantages over other methods of 
measuring case awareness and attributing attitude change to the Court. The conceptual 
improvement is derived from the differences between being exposed to new information 
and understanding it. These are related activities, but not identical ones. The empirical 
differences manifest themselves in several ways including over reporting. Measuring 
reception by comprehension of cases reduces the empirical problems associated other 
methods of assessing case awareness. Also, the single best predictor of receiving 
Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and McCreary is one’s general political knowledge. 
Individual and domain specific information such as ideology and having an extreme 
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initial are sometimes related to case reception, but lack a systematic pattern. The 
implication of these findings is that public law scholars need consider one’s general level 
of political information when explaining case awareness. Other variables, including those 
previously thought of as critical to this process like media consumption, do not perform 
as well as some scholars argue. 
The results of Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the complex nature of examining the 
Court as an elite role player in attitude change. Reception of cases is sometimes related to 
attitude change; however, few consistent patterns emerge from the analysis except that 
the Court’s influence on public opinion is modest when it exists. Situating the Court 
within the broader elite debate (as defined by media reporting on political elites) yields 
some useful information at times and is less instructive at others. The results raise some 
questions about the research design used in this study and also point to some directions 
for future research. 
An important place to begin is the key variable of receiving cases. Throughout 
this study, reception is measured the same way. First, individuals must demonstrate they 
were exposed to a Court case. Second, they must be able to put that case in their own 
words. While an improvement of previous methods, this approach creates a dichotomy 
that is limited in several respects. As noted earlier, the open-ended item for 
comprehension of a case only measures whether individuals understood the winning 
coalition of judges. While sometimes unanimous, Court cases can have majority or 
plurality opinions and often dissenting opinions; such was the case in this study. 
Reception, as used in this project, does not measure whether an individual understood the 
positions of other justices. It is possible that receiving elite cues from dissenting justices 
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is contributing to the mixed findings. In the future, it would be useful to determine 
whether this is actually happening. One way to do this is to include another layer of 
questions prompting individuals for the winning and losing coalitions when they exist.  
Placing the Court’s message within the broader elite debate is an important part of 
this analysis. Measuring the broader elite debate by counting the number of elites quoted 
on each side of an issue in news reports raises some potential problems. The measure is a 
blunt instrument. It does not account for the tone of coverage. I do not assess whether the 
elites quoted were presented in a positive or negative manner. The tone of coverage may 
lead to a number of media effects on attitudes (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Also, my 
coding of the broader elite debate treats every elite equally. This has at least two 
consequences. First, the public does not evaluate all elites equally. Some may have more 
legitimacy and credibility leading to a greater effect on an individual’s evaluation of new 
information.  Second, I did not measure how much attention each elite received outside of 
whether they were quoted. An elite with a one sentence quote is treated the same as one 
with lengthier quotes or writing an entire editorial. Last, the content analysis was 
conducted entirely by the author and inter-coder reliability statistics are not available. 
These shortcoming should be addressed into future assessments of the broader elite 
debate.  
A related potential criticism is that I do not isolate the source of one’s knowledge 
about the Court cases. While I control for some variance in media consumption, outside 
of measuring whether one consumes television, radio, or internet news, I do not assess 
the exact news source. Some individuals may learn about cases from sources with known 
ideological or editorial slants such as The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Rush 
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Limbaugh. Even though media consumption did not generally have a systematic effect on 
receiving a case, the source of information about the Court may be relevant. Individuals 
may correctly understand a case, but receive the information from a source critical or 
supportive of the decision. For example, if two individuals frequently listen to Rush 
Limbaugh or Air America Radio, they may both understand a Court case because it is a 
topic on talk radio. However, they may evaluate the credibility of the decision based on 
the vastly different editorial comments on the case. 
The analysis presented in this project treated religion and religiosity as control 
variables. The results for these variables in many of the models are robust and consistent. 
Religion and religiosity should receive more attention in the process of Court-driven 
attitude change. This is particularly important for the issues of Webster, Stanford, Van 
Orden and McCreary because they are laden with religious issues like abortion, the death 
penalty, and publicly displaying the Ten Commandments. 
Future research can extend the research design to cases of different salience 
levels, additional issue areas, and alignments of the justices. Previous research, including 
this project, has demonstrated that the Court can influence public opinion when ruling on 
salient issues. Each case in this analysis is salient cases on two different levels: they 
appeared on the front page of the New York Times and deal with a personal issue, 
religion. The opportunity for the Court to shape public opinion is potentially greatest 
when dealing with personal issues like religion (Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Johnson and 
Martin 1998). Again, as pointed out by Hoekstra (2003), studying salient cases could 
over-estimate the Court’s ability to shape public opinion because these comprise a 
minority of the docket. However, even if these few cases lead public opinion, the Court 
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could still have an important impact on public opinion. Salient cases potentially have the 
greatest impact on public opinion due to higher rates of receiving the elite cue provided 
by the Court. 
It would also be advantageous to include cases about issues less salient to 
Americans. Most Supreme Court cases do not deal with hot button issues like abortion, 
the death penalty, and religion in the public square. These are controversial issues that the 
public may have well-elaborated ideas that are resistant to change. The bulk of the 
Court’s docket deals with issues that are less controversial and salient to the public. It is 
possible that the effect of receiving Court decisions on less salient issues is greater as the 
public is probably less wedded to their preexisting beliefs. 
The cases in this study feature closely divided Court including Webster’s plurality 
decision. It would be useful to compare reception of unanimous and divided Court 
opinions to test whether a one-sided message from the Court has a different effect on 
public opinion than two-sided decisions like Van Orden and McCreary. It is possible that 
the effect of Court decisions varies based on whether the Court speaks with one unified 
voice or is closely divided. The 5-4 voting alignments in Stanford, Van Orden, 
McCreary, and the more confusing Webster, provide the public with two different sets of 
cues from the justices—one set of cues from the majority and another from the dissenters. 
I do not have leverage on whether the alignment of justices is related to the effect of 
receiving the Court’s cues because of the nature of the cases in the analysis. In the future, 
it will be useful to target cases with different winning coalitions, but that can be difficult 
because the voting alignment of justices is not known when pre-decision samples are 
collected. In some senses, the researcher is captive to the uncertain outcome of cases and 
112 
it may not be possible to correctly identify unanimous and non-unanimous cases, or 
particular voting alignments of the Court when collecting pre-decision attitudes under 
real world conditions. Due to this, experimental designs would be particularly useful for 
future research because they allow the researcher to manipulate the nature and size of the 
winning coalition. 
This research could explore whether receiving a case in one issue area could be 
influencing attitudes on related topics. For example, does understanding that Lawrence 
and Garner v. Texas (2003)47 overturned same-sex, consensual, adult sodomy influence 
public opinion on a related issue like same-sex marriage? Also, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether receiving a case like Van Orden influences attitudes toward other 
public expressions of religion such as the debate over the presence of “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance. While the comprehension-geographic proximity hypothesis is a 
step in the right direction by investigating the effect of receiving Van Orden on attitudes 
toward the Kentucky display, the presence of McCreary complicates the analysis as there 
is a relevant, contemporaneous case in the same issue area to compete with Van Orden. 
The approach employed in this study hinged on people remembering the elite cue 
provided by the Court. An alternative theory of attitude change, on-line information 
processing, could explain why some individuals exhibited attitude change that was not 
related to receiving the cases. With an on-line process, individuals create an overall 
evaluation of abortion, the death penalty, or publicly displaying the Ten Commandments 
over time including Webster, Stanford, Van Orden or McCreary if they received the 
Court’s messages. Individuals may then update their beliefs without remembering 
                                                 
47 539 U.S. 558 
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receiving new information or the source of it (e.g. Hastie and Park 1986, Wyer and Shrull 
1986, Lodge, McGraw and Stroh 1989). From this perspective, an individual could 
exhibit signs of attitude change without demonstrating reception of the Court cases. 
While this kind of running tally may certainly be at work here, reception of the Court’s 
elite cue, under certain conditions, does matter for individuals in this study. The results 
demonstrate that understanding and remembering Court cases is related to attitude 
change. 
Many questions remain about whether and how the Court influences public 
opinion. This project advances our knowledge of Court-driven attitude change by using 
reception to measure awareness of cases and situating the decisions within the broader 
elite debate. Although these two steps are important, as noted above, many questions 
remain and there are numerous possibilities for future research. By combining public law 
and American politics research, this project is useful to scholars in both fields. Overall, 
the results demonstrate that receiving Court decisions is sometimes related to attitude 
change on the issues associated with the cases. Given the mixed findings and questions 
noted above, there is tremendous potential for future research to shed more light on 
whether and how the Court influences public opinion. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 2.1. The Effect of Receiving Court Cases Given Different Alignments of Non 






































Figure 2.2. The Effect of Receiving Court Cases Given Different Alignments of Non-



































Table 3.1. Frequency of Stories and Average Number of Elites Quoted by Media Source in the 
Year Prior to Webster, Stanford, Van Orden, and McCreary 
    
Abortion and Webster 





Newspaper    
New York Times 52 5.5 5 
National Network News    
NBC  2 4.5 11 
CBS 2 3 4.5 
ABC 4 4 5.2 
Avg. # of Elites Quoted (All Stories)  5.1 5.1 
Total # of Stories 60 Diff. of Means .03 
    
The Death Penalty and Stanford or Wilkins 





Newspaper    
New York Times 9 4.2 6.1 
National Network News    
NBC  2 3 1.5 
CBS 2 3 1.5 
ABC 4 3 .18 
Avg. # of Elites Quoted (All Stories)  3.6 4 
Total # of Stories 17 Diff. of Means .36 
 
Publicly Displaying the Ten Commandments and Van Orden or McCreary 





Newspaper    
New York Times 13 3.3 3 
Austin American Statesman 8 3.8 2.6 
National Network News    
NBC  4 4.5 2.3 
CBS 4 1.8 1.2 
ABC 6 3.0 2.0 
Avg. # of Elites Quoted (All Stories)  3.3 2.5 
Total # of Stories 35 Diff. of Means .86** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
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Table 3.2. Coding of NES Categories for Receiving (Understanding) Webster 
 
Categories of Respondent Answers Coded 
As Receiving Webster 
 
Categories of Respondent Answers Coded As 
Missing Webster
Allowed abortion to continue, trying to 
change laws on abortion, middle of the 
road, a difficult decision to follow or 
understand 
 
Respondent did not report exposure to 
Webster 
Against abortion, anti-abortion, against 
women’s rights, basically pro-life, 
limited abortion 
 
Decided for abortion, let women decide for 
themselves, other incorrect 
 
Upheld Roe v. Wade, Didn’t overturn Roe 
v. Wade 
 
Made abortion illegal, outlawed abortion, 
overturned Roe v. Wade 
Court still making up its mind, Court hasn’t 
really decided yet, Court may overturn 
Roe v. Wade, holding off until next 
term 
 
Don’t think [the Court has released the 
decision] 
Left it up to the states, gave it back to the 
states, let the local level decide 
 
I used to know but I forgot 
Mention of: Missouri case, Missouri law, 
Webster, Webster case 
 
Other response, not classified 
Specifics mentioned: ban on public funding 
or public facilities to perform abortions, 
requirements for viability testing of the 
fetus, parental consent for abortions, 
any mention of Supreme Court Justices 
by name, other specific details 
reflecting extensive knowledge 
No, Can’t remember 
Missing, no answer, unintelligible, no 
ascertained 
No wave 2 
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Table 3.3. Coding of NES Categories for Receiving (Understanding) Stanford 
 
Categories of Respondent Answers Coded 
as Receiving Stanford 
 
 
Categories of Respondent Answers Coded as 
Missing Stanford
In favor of the death penalty, supported 
death penalty 
 
Respondent did not report exposure to 
Stanford 
Left it up to the states, gave it back to the 
states, let local level decide 
 
Against death penalty, banned death penalty, 
made death penalty illegal, other incorrect 
Can execute minors, teens, lowered age, 
mention of minors 
 
Hasn’t decided yet, didn’t make any decision 
 
Can execute retarded, mentally impaired, 
mention of retarded 
 
Reinstated death penalty 
 
Mention minors and retarded, other specific 
details reflecting extensive knowledge 
I used to know but I forgot 
 
 Other response, not classified 
 
 No, Can’t remember 
 Missing, no answer, unintelligible, no 
ascertained 
 No wave 2 
 




Long-Term Stanford Van Orden McCreary 
% Reporting 
Exposure to the 
Case 
80% 69% 34% 76% 53% 












Long Term Stanford Van Orden McCreary 
Political Information 0.47*** 0.60*** 0.36*** 0.55*** 0.63*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
Education 0.33*** 0.22** 0.06   
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)   
T.V. News -0.00 -0.07 0.15** -0.09 -0.11 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) 
Print News -0.15 -0.08 0.15 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) 
Internet News    -0.12 0.02 
    (0.10) (0.10) 
Talk Politics 0.11** 0.07 0.08   
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)   
SCOTUS Therm. -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Extreme Initial Position 0.52** 0.57** -0.61* -0.52 -0.56 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.32) (0.75) (0.84) 
Female 0.18 0.08 -0.47 0.25 1.18** 
 (0.24) (0.29) (0.30) (0.53) (0.57) 
White 0.02 0.40 0.35 1.04* 0.72 
 (0.42) (0.57) (0.69) (0.56) (0.60) 
Age 0.01 -0.02* 0.01   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Liberal -0.08 0.10 0.14 -0.25 0.19 
 (0.45) (0.57) (0.67) (0.64) (0.64) 
Conservative -0.01 -0.23 -0.03 2.42*** 1.20 
 (0.41) (0.53) (0.65) (0.94) (0.83) 
Republican -0.16 0.04 0.30 -1.28 -0.40 
 (0.44) (0.52) (0.65) (0.82) (0.79) 
Democrat -0.39 -0.20 0.27 -0.40 0.67 
 (0.45) (0.54) (0.65) (0.59) (0.62) 
Catholic 0.25 -0.04 -0.14   
 (0.27) (0.34) (0.33)   
Christian    -0.06 0.58 
    (0.56) (0.55) 
Church Attendance 0.12 0.16* -0.02 0.03 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.23) (0.24) 
Constant -2.52*** -2.21* -4.81*** -2.53* -4.65*** 
 (0.89) (1.13) (1.29) (1.35) (1.50) 
Observations 464 314 406 111 113 
log likelihood -248.480 -164.681 -166.198 -57.493 -56.016 
PseudoR2 0.217 0.238 0.163 0.247 0.231 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% (two-tailed) 
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Table 4.1. Individual-Level Attitude Change on Abortion and the Death Penalty 
 Short-Term Change Long-Term Change
Abortion   
% Allowing Abortion in More 
Circumstances After the Webster 21% 23% 
% Allowing Abortion in Fewer 
Circumstances After the Webster 14% 14% 
   
Death Penalty   
% More Supportive of the Death 
Penalty After Stanford 13% n/a 
% Less Supportive of the Death 
Penalty after Stanford 15% n/a 
 
 
Table 4.2. Change in Support for Abortion and the Death Penalty by Receiving Webster and 
Stanford 




% Allowing Fewer 
Abortions After 
Webster
Short-Term    
Received Webster 19% 71% 10% 
Did Not Receive 
Webster 22% 60% 18% 
    
Long-Term    
Received Webster 18% 74% 9% 
Did Not Receive 
Webster 29% 55% 16% 
    
 % With More 
Support for the Death 
Penalty 
No Change
% With Less 
Support for the 
Death Penalty
Received Stanford  17% 65% 18% 
Did Not Receive 
Stanford 12% 73% 15% 
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Table 4.3. MNL Regression Results for the Short-Term Effects of Receiving Webster on Abortion Attitudes 



























-0.53* 0.25           
            
             
            
          
            
             
            
             
            
             
            
           
            
             
            
             
            
             
            
             
            
             
            
         
            
             
     0.02) 0.02)       
             
            
             
        0.06) 0.06)   
             
            
            
          .61 .61) 
            
            
             
            
             
0.19 0.31 -0.54 -1.00 -0.25 0.30 0.48 0.19 -0.62 -0.52
(0.32) (0.32) (0.79) (0.52) (1.18) (1.15) (0.66) (0.63) (0.95) (0.95) (0.45) (0.43)
Initial Position
 
0.56*** -1.52*** 0.71*** -1.51*** 0.56*** -1.53*** 0.56*** -1.52*** 0.59*** -1.53*** 0.44** -1.63***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.24) (0.27) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20)
Political Info. 
 
-0.18** -0.05 -0.18* -0.05 -0.18* -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.31 -0.16 -0.15 -0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.35) (0.34) (0.10) (0.09)
SCOTUS Therm.
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Catholic
 
0.87*** 0.21 0.88*** 0.21 0.88*** 0.26 0.88*** 0.21 0.94*** 0.21 0.83** 0.12
(0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35)
Church Att.
 
0.29*** -0.27*** 0.28** -0.27*** 0.29*** -0.26** 0.29*** -0.27*** 0.31*** -0.28*** 0.25** -0.34***





-0.00 1.09* 0.01 1.09* -0.00 1.00* -0.03 1.09* -0.07 1.10*
(0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58)
Democrat
 
-0.13 0.71 -0.11 0.72 -0.13 0.63 -0.15 0.71 -0.21 0.72 -0.35 -1.11**
(0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.59) (0.45) (0.46)
Liberal
 
0.03 -0.62 0.08 -0.62 0.03 -0.62 0.05 -0.62 0.09 -0.62 -0.17 -0.53
(0.55) (0.51) (0.55) (0.52) (0.55) (0.52) (0.55) (0.51) (0.55) (0.52) (0.60) (0.57)
Conservative
 
-0.12 -1.10** -0.09 -1.10** -0.12 -1.09** -0.12 -1.10** -0.04 -1.11** -0.19 -0.72
(0.52) (0.47) (0.52) (0.47) (0.52) (0.48) (0.52) (0.47) (0.52) (0.48) (0.56) (0.53)
Female
 
-0.35 0.27 -0.34 0.27 -0.35 0.25 -0.35 0.27 -0.39 0.29 -0.33 0.48
(0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.33) (0.32)
Black
 
0.57 0.63 0.54 0.63 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.62 0.73 0.71
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54)
 
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.57)
Received Webster   -0.32 -0.01
x. Initial Position (0.32) (0.34)
Received Webster 0.00 0.02
x. SCOTUS Therm. (  (
Received Webster
  
-0.08 -0.01 -0.81 0.13
x. Pol. Info. (0.17) (0.17) (0.59) (0.54)
















-2.92*** 0.59 -3.33*** 0.56 -2.90** 1.27 -3.00*** 0.58 -3.56*** 0.67 -2.57** 1.71*
(1.01) (0.90) (1.10) (0.93) (1.18) (1.08) (1.02) (0.91) (1.10) (0.96) (1.05) (0.91)
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 428 428
log likelihood -328.319 -327.818 -327.664 -328.199 -326.844 -300.230
PseudoR2 0.191 0.192 0.193 0.191 0.195 0.195
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
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Table 4.4. MNL Regression Results for the Long-Term Effect of Receiving Webster on Abortion Attitudes 
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     0.02) 0.02)       
             
            
              
        0.07) 0.06)   
            
            
             
          1.15) 0.86) 
            
            
             
      
       
0.39 -0.07 -0.96 -1.29 1.42 -0.34 0.25 -3.73 -1.16 -0.27
(0.42) (0.37) (1.06) (0.60) (1.52) (1.39) (0.88) (0.88) (1.46) (2.56) (0.85) (0.64)
Initial Position
 
0.84*** -1.29*** 1.01*** -1.22*** 0.84*** -1.31*** 0.81*** -1.29*** 0.81*** -1.34*** 0.76** -1.24***
(0.24) (0.20) (0.31) (0.28) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.24) (0.21) (0.34) (0.25)
Political Info.
 
-0.35*** 0.02 -0.35*** 0.02 -0.35*** 0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.13 -0.37 -0.45** 0.03
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.44) (0.38) (0.19) (0.14)
SCOTUS Therm.
 
0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Catholic
 
0.70 -0.28 0.72 -0.29 0.71 -0.25 0.79* -0.28 0.81* -0.36 1.22* -0.64
(0.45) (0.40) (0.45) (0.40) (0.45) (0.40) (0.46) (0.40) (0.47) (0.41) (0.65) (0.54)
Church Att.
 
0.42*** -0.18 0.41*** -0.19 0.42*** -0.18 0.42*** -0.18 0.43*** -0.20 0.51** -0.19





-0.86 0.41 -0.84 0.41 -0.88 0.39 -1.02* 0.39 -1.03* 0.42
(0.60) (0.64) (0.61) (0.64) (0.60) (0.64) (0.62) (0.65) (0.62) (0.66)
Democrat
 
-0.77 0.74 -0.75 0.75 -0.78 0.75 -0.83 0.72 -0.87 0.72 -0.20 0.25
(0.62) (0.65) (0.63) (0.65) (0.62) (0.64) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.66) (0.82) (0.61)
Liberal
 
0.06 -0.48 0.06 -0.47 0.05 -0.50 0.27 -0.46 0.23 -0.47 0.06 0.88
(0.79) (0.60) (0.79) (0.60) (0.79) (0.60) (0.80) (0.60) (0.80) (0.60) (1.36) (1.23)
Conservative
 
0.30 -0.70 0.30 -0.70 0.30 -0.69 0.33 -0.68 0.31 -0.76 0.81 0.92
(0.72) (0.55) (0.72) (0.55) (0.72) (0.55) (0.73) (0.55) (0.74) (0.56) (1.29) (1.21)
Female
 
-0.99** 0.01 -0.96** 0.01 -0.99** 0.02 -1.03** 0.02 -1.04** 0.08 -1.18* -0.15
(0.42) (0.34) (0.42) (0.34) (0.42) (0.34) (0.43) (0.34) (0.43) (0.34) (0.66) (0.43)
Black
 
-0.09 -0.61 -0.10 -0.60 -0.09 -0.59 0.03 -0.61 0.08 -0.75 0.48 -0.17
(0.78) (0.71) (0.79) (0.71) (0.78) (0.71) (0.80) (0.71) (0.81) (0.73) (0.99) (0.86)
Received Webster -0.42 -0.14
x. Initial Position (0.42) (0.36)
Received Webster 0.01 0.01
x. SCOTUS Therm. (  (
Received Webster
  
-0.60** 0.02 0.20 1.88

















-2.30* 0.15 -2.75* 0.04 -2.09 0.63 -2.86** 0.14 -2.83* 0.77 -2.25 -1.53
(1.32) (1.10) (1.43) (1.12) (1.54) (1.27) (1.37) (1.11) (1.48) (1.20) (2.13) (1.70)
Observations 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 196 196
log likelihood -222.650 -222.119 -222.345 -219.275 -217.023 -125.990
PseudoR2 0.199 0.201 0.200 0.211 0.219 0.215
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed)
 
Figure 4.1. The Probability of Becoming More Conservative on Abortion by Reception of 
Webster and Consumption of Elite Cues, Long Term Model (Linear 































Figure 4.2. The Probability of Becoming More Liberal on Abortion by Reception of 
Webster and Consumption of Elite Cues, Long-Term Model (Non-Linear 
































Figure 4.3. The Probability of Becoming More Liberal on Abortion by Reception of 






















Figure 4.4. The Probability of Becoming More Conservative on Abortion by Reception of 
























Table 4.5. Ordered Probit Regression Results for Death Penalty Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Comprehension -0.06 0.23 0.27 0.85 1.80 
 (0.17) (0.34) (0.66) (0.53) (1.11) 
Initial Position -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.43*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Pol. Info. -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.19 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
SCOTUS Therm. -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Catholic -0.65*** -0.63*** -0.65*** -0.67*** -0.67*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Church Attendance -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Republican -0.27 -0.30 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Democrat -0.52** -0.54** -0.52** -0.52** -0.57** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Liberal -0.30 -0.28 -0.29 -0.33 -0.33 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Conservative -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.23 -0.25 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Female 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Black -0.62** -0.61** -0.63** -0.62** -0.59** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Comprehension x.   -0.16    
Initial Position  (0.15)    
Comprehension x.   -0.00   
SCOTUS Therm.   (0.01)   
Comprehension x.    -0.20* -0.76 
Political Information    (0.11) (0.51) 
Pol. Info. Squared     -0.03 
     (0.02) 
Comprehension x.     0.07 
Pol Info Sq.     (0.06) 
Observations 401 398 401 401 401 
log likelihood -280.714 -276.696 -280.576 -279.052 -277.615 
PseudoR2 0.108 0.109 0.109 0.114 0.118 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(two-tailed) 
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Figure 4.5. The Probability of Becoming More Supportive of the Death Penalty by 

























Table 5.1. Attitudes Before and After Van Orden and McCreary 




% of Individuals Becoming More 
Supportive of the Ten 
Commandment Display Over Time 
(Don’t Know Excluded) 
17% 16% 
   
% of Individuals Becoming Less 
Supportive of the Ten 
Commandment Display Over Time 
(Don’t Know Excluded) 
15% 21% 
 
Table 5.2. Change in Support for the Ten Commandment Displays by Reception of 
the Cases 
 Shifted to More 
Support No Change
Shifted to Less 
Support
Van Orden (TX)    
Received Van Orden 20% 63% 16% 
Missed Van Orden 16% 72% 12% 
    
McCreary (KY)    
Received McCreary 8% 68% 24% 
Missed McCreary 21% 60% 19% 
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Table 5.3. Ordered Probit Regression Results for Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary v. ACLU.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
 Van Orden McCreary Van Orden McCreary Van Orden McCreary Van Orden McCreary Van Orden McCreary
Received Case 
 
-0.352 -0.612** 0.588        
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
         
          
            
          
       
         
          
          
       
          
        0.055 0.066 
          
           
           
          
-0.540 -0.976 -0.066 -1.366** -1.006 -1.165 -1.864
(0.284) (0.278) (0.457) (0.399) (0.905) (0.957) (0.638) (0.704) (1.298) (1.511)
Initial Position
 
-0.667*** -0.444*** -0.431** -0.425*** -0.663*** -0.456*** -0.696*** -0.453*** -0.786*** -0.469***
(0.163) (0.144) (0.185) (0.163) (0.163) (0.145) (0.165) (0.145) (0.174) (0.147)
Pol. Info.
 
0.067 0.025 0.094 0.028 0.062 0.025 -0.056 -0.004 -0.665* -0.403
(0.067) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.097) (0.081) (0.352) (0.271)
SCOTUS Therm.
 
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Liberal
 
0.109 0.563* 0.061 0.548* 0.122 0.561* 0.121 0.569* 0.103 0.615**
(0.305) (0.298) (0.310) (0.304) (0.306) (0.298) (0.308) (0.298) (0.312) (0.303)
Conservative
 
0.380 0.036 0.781* 0.049 0.340 0.052 0.422 0.050 0.555 0.074
(0.429) (0.397) (0.465) (0.400) (0.433) (0.399) (0.434) (0.398) (0.449) (0.405)
Democrat
 
-0.531* -0.244 -0.513* -0.235 -0.539* -0.256 -0.552* -0.236 -0.508* -0.222
(0.301) (0.291) (0.306) (0.294) (0.302) (0.292) (0.303) (0.292) (0.307) (0.293)
Republican
 
0.187 0.696* 0.184 0.696* 0.186 0.674* 0.144 0.690* 0.158 0.710*
(0.382) (0.373) (0.391) (0.373) (0.383) (0.375) (0.387) (0.373) (0.398) (0.384)
Christian
 
0.592** 0.401 0.615** 0.401 0.562** 0.416 0.511* 0.381 0.605** 0.350
(0.281) (0.270) (0.285) (0.270) (0.285) (0.271) (0.287) (0.272) (0.293) (0.279)
Church Attend.
 
0.049 -0.142 0.071 -0.142 0.048 -0.142 0.070 -0.137 0.083 -0.120
(0.115)
 
(0.109) (0.116) (0.109) (0.115)
 
(0.109) (0.116) (0.109) (0.118) (0.110)
Received Case x. -0.727*** -0.062
Initial position (0.276) (0.249)
Received Case x. 0.011 -0.009
SCOTUS Therm. (0.015) (0.015)
Received Case x. 
  






Received Case x. 
 








Observations 106 107 106 107 106 107 106 107 106 107
log likelihood
 
-78.194 -86.734 -74.594 -86.703 -77.929 -86.557 -76.577 -86.547 -74.554 -85.246
PseudoR2 0.130 0.117 0.170 0.118 0.133 0.119 0.148 0.119 0.170 0.132
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed) 
Figure 5.1. The Probability of Losing Support for the Texas Display by Reception of Van 






















Figure 5.2 The Probability of Losing Support for the Texas Display by Reception of Van 























Table 5.4. Ordered Probit Regression Results for the Comprehension-Geographic 
Proximity Hypotheses 
 Model 6 Model 7
 McCreary McCreary
Received Van Orden -0.029 -0.279 
 (0.461) (0.378) 
Received McCreary -0.461* 0.441 
 (0.355) (0.667) 
Received Both Cases  -0.984* 
  (0.756) 
Initial Position -0.672*** -0.511*** 
 (0.169) (0.152) 
Political Information 0.071 0.014 
 (0.072) (0.070) 
SCOTUS Therm. 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Liberal 0.196 0.570* 
 (0.317) (0.302) 
Conservative 0.279 0.403 
 (0.438) (0.432) 
Democrat -0.613* -0.292 
 (0.312) (0.296) 
Republican 0.276 0.435 
 (0.397) (0.391) 
Christian 0.592* 0.368* 
 (0.295) (0.277) 
Church Attendance -0.024 -0.152* 
 (0.117) (0.111) 
Observations 101 104 
log likelihood -73.876 -82.259 
PseudoR2 0.144 0.139 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% (one-tailed) 
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Figure 5.3. The Probability of Losing Support for the Texas Display by Reception of Van 





























Figure 5.4 The Probability of Gaining Support for the Texas Display by Reception of Van 































Figure 5.5. The Probability of Losing Support for the Kentucky Display by Reception of 




Received Van Orden 




















Appendix A: IRB Approval 
APPROVED BY IRB ON: 6/16/2005  EXPIRES ON: 6/16/2006  
 
Title:  Political Knowledge and Political Attitudes 
IRB PROTOCOL # 2005-00-76 
Conducted By: Michael A. Unger of the University of Texas at Austin, Department of 
Government, (512) 471-5121, Professor Daron Shaw of the University of Texas at 
Austin, Department of Government, (512) 471-5121. 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with information about the 
study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe this study to you and answer all of your 
questions. Please read the information below and ask questions about anything you don’t understand before 
deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can refuse to participate 
without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  You can stop your participation at 
any time by simply telling the researcher. 
 
If you are under 18, then you are not eligible to participate. 
 
The purpose of this study is to measure political knowledge and political attitudes. 
  
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
 • To complete two surveys at different times during your regularly scheduled class 
 
Total estimated time to participate in study is 15 minutes per survey. 
 
Risks and Benefits of being in the study 
 • The risk associated with this study is no greater than everyday life. 
 • There are no benefits for participation in this study 
  
Compensation: 
 • There is no compensation for participation 
  
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept private. Authorized persons from The University 
of Texas at Austin, members of the Institutional Review Board, and (study sponsors, if any) have the legal 
right to review your research records and will protect the confidentiality of those records to the extent 
permitted by law.  All publications will exclude any information that will make it possible to identify you as 
a subject.  
 
Contacts and Questions: 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now.  If you have questions later or want 
additional information, call the researchers conducting the study.  Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail 
addresses are at the top of this page. 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact Clarke A. 
Burnham, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects, (512) 232-4383. 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
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Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision about participating in 
this study.  I consent to participate in the study. 
 




___________________________________________________ Date: ___________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent 
 
 
Signature of Investigator:___________________________ Date: __________________ 
 
Participant Debriefing Form 
 
Title: Political Communication and Political Attitudes 
 
IRB PROTOCOL # 
 
Conducted By: Michael A. Unger of the University of Texas at Austin, Department of 
Government, 471-5121 and Professor Daron Shaw of the University of Texas at Austin, 
Department of Government, 471-5121 
 
You just participated in an investigation of the US Supreme Court’s influence on public 
opinion regarding two issues: The Ten Commandments posted on public grounds and the 
use of medicinal marijuana. Research in political science has shown that the Court can 
influence public opinion under certain circumstances, but not others. This study seeks to 
answer several questions related to this research: 
 
1. Does being exposed to Supreme Court cases influence the public’s position on 
these two issues? 
2. Do understanding Supreme Court decisions have an influence on the public’s 
position on these two issues that is distinct from being exposed to the case? 
3. Is this process affected by individual characteristics or one’s knowledge of 
politics? 
 
Please indicate whether you agree to have the data from your questionnaire included in 
the study: 
 
Yes _____                    No_____ 
 
Signature:__________________________ Date: __________________ 
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Appendix B: 2005 Experiment 
 
UT EID: __________ 
 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and does not have any influence on student 
grades. You may stop participating at any point of this survey. 
 
Please answer the following questions by filling in the appropriate blank or by circling 
the answer that describes your position the best: 
 
1. What job or political office does Bill Frist hold? 
__________________________ 
 
2. Who is the Secretary of State? 
__________________________ 
 
3. What job or office does William Rehnquist hold? 
__________________________ 
 
4. What job or political office does Vladimir Putin hold? 
__________________________ 
 
5. What job or political office does Tony Blair hold? 
__________________________ 
 
6. What job or political office does Mahmoud Abbas hold? 
__________________________ 
 
7. Who is the Speaker of the US House of Representatives? 
__________________________ 
 
8. Which party had the most members in the House of Representatives this session? 
__________________________ 
 
9. Which party had the most members in the U.S. Senate this session? 
__________________________ 
 
10. How old are you? 
__________________________ 
 










13. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 
Less than HS  High School  Some College  College or Beyond 
 
14. Is your religious preference Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish or Something Else (If 
something else, please specify)? 
__________________________ 
 
15. How often would you say that you go to (church/synagogue/other)? 
__________________________ 
 
16. How many days in a week do you read a daily newspaper? 
__________________________ 
 
17. How many days in a week do you watch television news broadcast? 
__________________________ 
 
18. How many days in a week do you get news from the Internet? 
__________________________ 
 
19. On a scale of 0 to 100, please rate the following people, groups, and institutions. A 
score of 0 means you do not like the person, group or institution at all. A score of 100 
means that you like the person, group or institution a great deal. A score of 50 means that 
you neither like nor dislike the person, group or institution. You may use any number 
between 0 and 100 for your rating. 
 
 George W. Bush  _____ 
 
 John Kerry   _____ 
 
Congress    _____ 
 
US Supreme Court   _____ 
 
 The Democratic Party  _____ 
 
The Republican Party  _____ 
 
 Liberals    _____ 
 
Conservatives    _____ 
  





21. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 




Other Party (If other, please specify __________________) 
Don’t Know 
 
22. When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a liberal, a 






[Questions 23 – 27 Randomized on Four Different Forms] 
 
You may have heard that some people want to remove the Ten Commandments from 
display on public buildings such the grounds of state capitol buildings or courthouses 
while others want it to remain. 
 
23. Do you agree or disagree with the Ten Commandments being displayed on the 














25. You may have heard of recent debate over whether same-sex couples should be 
permitted to be married. 
 
Do you agree or disagree that people of the same sex should be legally allowed to get 
married? 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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 Don’t Know 
 
26. On the issue of affirmative action, do you agree or disagree with public universities 
and colleges considering race when evaluating students for admission? 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Don’t Know 
 
27. There has been a lot of discussion lately about athletes using steroids and other 
performance enhancing drugs. Do you agree or disagree with banning athletes for life 
who repeatedly test positive for steroids or other performance enhancing drugs? 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Don’t Know 
 






Participation in this survey is voluntary and does not have any affect on student grades. 
You may stop participating at any point of this survey. 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
You may have heard that some people want to remove the Ten Commandments from display on 
public buildings such the grounds of state capitol buildings or courthouses while others want it to 
remain. 
 
1. Do you agree or disagree with the Ten Commandments being displayed on the grounds of the 
Texas state capitol? 
__ Strongly Agree 
__ Agree 
__ Disagree 
__ Strongly Disagree 
__ Don’t Know 
 
2. Do you agree or disagree with the Ten Commandments being posted in a courtroom? 
__ Strongly Agree 
__ Agree 
__ Disagree 
__ Strongly Disagree 
__ Don’t Know 
 
3. Have you heard of or read about a U.S. Supreme Court case this year about removing the Ten 
Commandments from display on a state capitol? 
__ Yes 
__ No 
__ Don’t Know 
 
If yes, please go on to question 4. If no, please go on to question 5. 
 







5. Have you heard of or read about a U.S. Supreme Court case this year about removing 




__ Don’t Know 
 
If yes, please go on to question 6. If no, please go on to question 7. 
 







Thank you for participating. 
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Appendix C: Summary Statistics 
 
Selected Summary Statistics for the 2005 Experiment (Chapter 3) 
School: Southwestern Public University (83%), Large Urban Community College (17%) 
Gender: Male 51%, Female 49% 
Religion: Christian 60%, Non-Christian 40% 
Church Attendance: Never (35%), several times a year (39%), monthly (9%), weekly 
(14%), more than weekly (3%) 
Party Identification: Republican (27%), Independent (26%), Democrat (47%) 
Ideology: Conservative (16%), Moderate (49%), Liberal (35%) 
Race/Ethnicity: White (63%), African-American (2%), Hispanic/Latino (16%), Native 
American (2%), Asian-American (12%), Middle Eastern (2%), Other (2%) 
SCOTUS Thermometer: Mean 60, SD 16.2 
 
Summary Statistics for Chapter 4: Webster and Stanford 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Change in Abortion Position (Short Term)  589 0.067912 0.582166 -1 1 
Change in Abortion Position (Long Term) 480 0.09375 0.600593 -1 1 
Change in Death Penalty Position 500 -0.028 0.528938 -1 1 
Reception of Webster (Short Term) 610 0.519672 0.500023 0 1 
Reception of Webster (Long Term) 401 0.508728 0.500548 0 1 
Reception of Stanford 608 0.164474 0.37101 0 1 
Initial Death Penalty Position 524 2.328244 1.026924 0 3 
Initial Abortion Position 606 1.808581 1.049042 0 3 
Political Information 613 3.278956 1.93999 0 8 
SCOTUS Thermometer 580 67.00862 18.00427 0 100 
Catholic 570 0.236842 0.425518 0 1 
Church Attendance 568 2.110915 1.470469 0 4 
Republican 605 0.429752 0.49545 0 1 
Democrat 605 0.464463 0.499148 0 1 
Liberal 554 0.288809 0.453618 0 1 
Conservative 554 0.617329 0.486478 0 1 
Female 614 0.604235 0.489413 0 1 




Summary Statistics for Chapter 5: Van Orden and McCreary 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Change in Position for TX Display (Van 
Orden) 0.027523 0.568603 -1 1 
Change in Position on the KY Display 
(McCreary) 0.027523 0.568603 -1 1 
Received Van Orden 0.38342 0.487484 0 1 
Received McCreary 0.329787 0.471391 0 1 
Initial Position TX Display 1.496815 0.997588 0 3 
Initial Position KY Display 1.3625 1.066868 0 3 
Political Information 4.095506 2.119824 0 9 
SCOTUS Thermometer 60.32768 17.87186 0 100 
Liberal 0.380682 0.48694 0 1 
Conservative 0.159091 0.366804 0 1 
Democrat 0.429379 0.496392 0 1 
Republican 0.254237 0.436667 0 1 
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